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ABSTRACT
True to the spirit of a social-democratic State, India had originally
evolved her power development policy, and shouldered that responsibility,
in line with the State’s professed commitment to honouring and ensuring
social security equations. Though the State Electricity Boards (SEBs)
were statutorily  required to function as autonomous service-cum-
commercial corporations, they became in effect agents of the
Governments to subserve the socio-economic policies of the State, and
hence never felt the requirement to break even or to contribute to capacity
expansion programs. This unaccountability culture in turn led to gross
inefficiency at all levels – technical, institutional and organizational, as
well as financial. And the cost escalation from such pampered inefficiency
remained above the revenue realized from an irrational subsidized pricing
practice.  With losses mounting up, the field was getting cleared for some
new entrants of ideas and practices, that the so-called ‘fiscal crisis’ at the
turn of the nineties ushered in subsequently. Thus has commenced an
era of reforms and restructuring of power sector in India, at the initiation
of the World Bank that has also lit up an informed atmosphere of debates
and discourses. However, little light has been thrown on the significant
aspects of inefficiency costs involved in the SEBs’ forced functioning
that allegedly finally warranted the reforms. The present study is a  modest
attempt at this.    Here, inter alia, we have estimated, on some very
plausible assumptions, the avoidable cost of inefficiency at a few
amenable levels and found it to represent about one-third of the reported
cost of electricity supply in India in 1997-98 ! And this is regardless of a
number of other possible inefficiency sources at all levels of performance.
Jel Classification : Q4; L94
Key words: India, electricity, cost inefficiency, commercial loss, reform.
41.  Introduction
The electric utility is unique in that its product is one that cannot
be stored for marketing, but must be generated the instant it is to be
used. The economies of scale involved in such a technical characteristic
had traditionally rendered the utility a vertically integrated industry,
combining all the three functions of generation, transmission and
distribution. The consequent natural monopoly position of the industry
in turn had concurrently meant its state regulation or outright
nationalization. Where the state held the reins of the utility, as in India
and in most of other developing countries, avowed adherence to
improvements in equity equations overshadowed essential economic
efficiency parameters in the development and operation of this
infrastructure. However, times have soon come up to frame new rhymes
of perspectives. It has now been recognized that the economies of scale
have already been exhausted or become irrelevant, the vertical integration
can safely be ‘unbundled’, and that (at least) in generation, monopoly
structure can effectively be mown up, and competition commissioned
instead. Thus has commenced an era of reforms and restructuring of
power sector across the globe. In no time have the waves of reforms,
sprung and sponsored by the premier international financial agency, swept
over the Indian power sector too to germinate radical results of irreversible
imposition of restructuring.
5Power development is placed in the concurrent list of the Indian
Constitution,  as a joint responsibility of both the States and the Centre.
In the First Five Year Plan (FYP), 19.02 per cent of the total Plan outlay
was earmarked for power development. Even though the power sector
outlay has steadily increased since then in absolute terms, its percentage
share fell to 8.89 per cent in the Second FYP, and then rose in the
subsequent Plans to reach the all-time maximum of 20.13 per cent in the
6th FYP, only to fall again in the 7th  (19.04 per cent) and 8th (18.33 per
cent) Plans. The total installed capacity (IC) grew at an average annual
compound growth rate of 8.65 per cent during the last four decades from
3,223.11 mega watt (MW) in 1957-58 to 89,090 MW in 1997-98. The
share of hydel in total capacity plummeted to 24.6 per cent from 37.7
per cent and that of thermal (including nuclear) went up to 76.4 per cent
from 62.3 per cent. Out of the total IC in 1997-98, 63.3 per cent was
owned by the States, 30.7 per cent by the Centre, and 6 per cent was in
the private sector. Actual generation increased during these four decades
at a rate of 9.45 per cent p. a., from 11,369.14 million units (MU; 1 unit
= 1 kWh) in 1957-58 to 4,20,405 MU in 1997-98, and total sales of
electricity at a rate of 9.0 per cent p. a., from 9,345 MU to 2,93,479 MU
respectively.
This seemingly impressive growth, however, conceals much of
the innate inadequacies of the system; its deficient capacity, lagging far
behind the growing demand, has plunged the country into a chronic
shortage situation – with an energy deficit of 11.5 per cent and a peak
load deficit of 18 per cent by the end of the 8th Plan (1996-97). Still
worse, the per capita consumption of electricity in India has been one of
the lowest in the world. The immediate victims of the widening load-
capacity gap have been the quality and reliability of the power supplied;
for example, the Kerala system operates under low voltage and low
frequency (some times up to 47.5 Hz, instead of 50 Hz) to reduce load
6further in addition to regular power cuts and load shedding, that have
become the rule of the day.
The cumulative effect of a legion of compounded forces has been
at work behind this plight of shortages. For one thing, in no Plan period
the target in IC could actually be achieved, the cumulative slippage
between the target and the achievement remaining well over 20 per cent.
Poor capacity utilization has substantially corroded the system
performance. Capacity utilization in terms of energy generated per KW
of IC grew over the last four decades in India at an average annual
compound rate of just 0.73 per cent from 3,527.38 KWh/KW in 1957-
58 (utilization of 40.27 per cent) to 4,718.9 KWh/KW (53.87 per cent)
in 1997-98. Still much more dismal is the condition of capacity utilization
in terms of energy sold per KW of IC – with a growth rate of only 0.32
per cent p. a., from 2,899.37 KWh/KW (33.10 per cent utilization) to
3,294.19 KWh/KW (37.61 per cent) over the same period. The growth
over the last four decades of energy generated and sold indicates an
elesticity of energy sales with respect to energy generated of just 0.843.
This highlights high levels of auxiliary consumption and extremely high
transmission and distribution (T&D) losses. Adding to these infirmities
of inadequacies have been the financial failures from a host of other
factors – irrational pricing practices and over-manning, sponsored by
political pampering of subsidies at the cost of efficiency, and an
infamously flourishing ‘X-inefficiency culture’.
The financial morbidity of the SEBs has allegedly not only
decelerated capacity addition in the States, but damped down the private
sector sentiments also.  As the agenda notes of the recent conference of
Power Ministers noted, “Fresh attempts at generation projects by
Independent Power Producers (IPP) have reached a dead end with escrow
capacity having been more or less exhausted in the country” (Government
7of India  2000: 1).  The only alternative of Central sector investment too
stands to suffer from the mounting receivables from the SEBs; (the SEBs
owe NTPC a cumulative sum of Rs. 12428 crores – ibid.: 1). The failure
in adequate additions in capacity by all the sectors thus continues, and
serves as an impetus to inviting World Bank initiation into reforms.
In what follows, we attempt to look into the above aspects for a
possible explanation of what in their behaviour trajectories have
warranted reforms in the power sector in India in general and Kerala in
particular.  The references to Kerala situation in this paper arises out of a
larger study intended to diagnose the problem faced by the power sector
in the State. Nevertheless, our observation on Kerala apply to most other
SEBs, though in varying degrees. The plan of this paper is as follows: In
the next section, physical performance of the State power sector is
evaluated, and the inadequacy and inefficiency1  involved are brought
out, in relation to their possible causatives.  Section 3 analyses the cost
structure of electricity supply in India; and cost savings realizable from
some reasonable improvements in efficiency at certain accessible levels
of techno-economic performance are also estimated. After a brief
discussion in Section 4 on the tariff structure, we take up in Section 5 an
appraisal of the financial performance of the State power sector and light
up the likely implications involved in inefficiency. The final part
concludes the discussion with a rather cynical note on the power sector
reforms vis-à-vis the form-substance dialectics.
2. Physical Performance
Inadequate Capacity Additions
The apparently impressive growth in installed capacity at the
aggregate national level, however, is not distributed evenly across regions.
During the seventies, marked by pervasive enthusiasm for power
development, regional disparity in the growth of IC was significantly
8evident; 9 States, out of the 19 considered, had a growth rate higher than
the national average of 7.5 per cent p. a., and 5 States, less than 5 per
cent. (Table 1). Even Kerala, which was a power surplus State during
this period, was in the intermediate group of States. While power
development of higher growth profile entails uneven distribution, power
shortage converges growth rates to the minimum and thus ensures an
equation among them, as has been evident since the eighties across the
States. None of the States has had a growth rate even to touch the
immediate vicinity of the national average of 6.6 per cent, all crowding
in around a minimum. This also signifies the shift in the weight of capacity
addition from the States to the Central sector. In fact, the share of the
Central sector in the ownership of the total IC increased from 9.8 per
cent in  1970-71 to 22.3 per cent in 1990-91 and then to 30.7 per cent in
1997-98, and the share of the States fell from about 80 per cent in 1970-
71 to 63.3 per cent in 1997-98. Thus, with every one percentage point
fall in the States’ share, the Central share increased by about 11 percentage
point. Indeed the Central sector IC growth rate (11.52 per cent) was
about twice the States’ sector one (5.97 per cent), with the former now
necessarily catering to the needs of the latter.
Even then, by the end of the 8th Plan (in 1996-97), the country as a
whole stood to suffer from a peak power deficit of 18 per cent, with little
change over the Plan period, and from an increased energy deficit of
11.5 per cent. In 1997-98, these deficits were respectively 11.3 and 8.1
per cent. In most of the States, the situation has been on the worse. Though
the Central and State governments do continue to be confident of the
dream of a power surplus nation coming into reality by  2012, a time-
run-out assertion, considering the present tempo of the progress in many
States in the highly unconducive atmosphere complicated by political,
social, and ecological issues and conducts, it just seems to be an excusable
quarter for another time-run-out. Significant in this respect has been the
9Table 1. Growth of Installed Capacity
   Installed Capacity (MW) Annual Average Compound
Growth  Rate (%)
1970-71  1980-81  1997-98   1970-81   1980-98     1970-98
Andhra Pradesh 608 2240 5764.2 13.929 5.717 8.687
Assam 180 228 616.7 2.392 6.028 4.666
Bihar 499 941 1988.4 6.549 4.499 5.254
Delhi 252 276 653.6 0.914 5.202 3.593
Gujarat 907 2197 4883.2 9.250 4.810 6.433
Haryana 504 1141 1780.3 8.514 2.651 4.785
Himachal Pradesh 51 129 299.5 9.724 5.080 6.776
Jammu & Kashmir 40 206 365.8 17.810 3.435 8.542
Karnataka 878 1470 3434.5 5.289 5.119 5.182
Kerala 547 1012 1775.8 6.350 3.366 4.461
Madhya Pradesh 727 1631 3875.9 8.416 5.224 6.395
Maharashtra 2119 3992 8289.8 6.538 4.392 5.182
Meghalaya 68* 131 188.8 14.013* 2.173 4.751*
Orissa 564 923 1693.0 5.049 3.633 4.155
Punjab 680 1536 2465.1 8.490 2.822 4.886
Rajasthan 541 810 1369.8 4.119 3.139 3.501
Tamil Nadu 1966 2329 5763 1.709 5.474 4.064
Uttar Pradesh 1351 3612 6168.8 10.334 3.199 5.786
West Bengal 1212 1726 2904 3.599 3.108 3.289
Central Sector 1441 2198 27379.5 4.313 15.994 11.522
DVC 1062 1422 ..
State Departments 974 1481 ..
Local Bodies 267 276 ..
Private Sector 1488 1382 5337.0 -0.736 8.272 4.844
All India 14709 30214 89090.0 7.464 6.568 6.899
Note:  * = For (with respect to) 1975-76; All India IC (1997-98) includes that for EDs,
BBMB and others (Islands).
Source: For 1970-71 and 1980-81 and for Haryana, from CMIE, Energy, March-April,
1999; 1997-98 from Planning Commission  (GOI), Annual Report on Working
of SEBs & EDs, April1999;  for Kerala, KSEB, Power System Statistics.
10
avoidable disturbing trend in the power sector investment in terms of an
unwarranted bias against cheap hydro-power, the hydro-thermal mix
being 1:3 by 1997-98; i.e., hydro-power accounts for only about 25 per
cent of the total IC in 1997-98. This in turn implies an untapped potential
of conventional hydro resources to the tune of about 74 per cent (out of
the total 84,000 MW estimated at 60 per cent load factor) in the country.
In the popular perception, the temptation would be to blame the organized
ecological concerns farrowing the high cost thermal power2 .  We are not
sure that this alone would explain the lack of enthusiasm in exploiting
the hydro potential in the country.
Technical Inefficiency
Side by side with this inadequate timely capacity additions has
been the inescapable long-run experience of under-utilization of the
existing capacity itself in the country. An unavoidable reason for an
apparent under-utilization of capacity stems from the gradual growth of
power demand against the periodic burst of increase in capacity due to
its indivisibility. Thus normally with every capacity addition, its utilization
rate immediately dips down, as was the case in most of the States during
the seventies. But in a power deficit situation, with inadequate capacity
addition against an ever-increasing demand, utilization of the available
capacity is necessarily expected to be higher, if not maximum. The actual
experience, however, has been far from this possibility. In 1997-98 (even
in the face of deficit), only 54 per cent of the existing IC in India was
utilized (Table 2). As many as 11 (out of 19) SEBs had a use factor much
less than this all-India average, including Kerala and Tamil Nadu in the
South, and only four (as well as the Central Sector with 63 per cent) had
a rate higher than 60 per cent. It should be noted that for a hydro-power
dominant system, such as in Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Kerala, and,
to some extent now, Karnataka, utilization efficiency should be evaluated
11
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with respect to firm power capacity (the always available and dependable
capacity corresponding to the minimum stream flow and storage) rather
than with respect to IC. Thus taking into account the hydel firm power
capacity of 714.5 MW of Kerala in 1997-98, the actual capacity utilization
comes out to be 6,308.46 KWh/KW or about 72 per cent. However, a
distressing question here concerns about the wide gap of ‘waste’ between
the IC and the dependable power of the hydro-plants; the latter being
just 42.3 per cent of the hydel  IC in Kerala in 1997-98. Considerable
timely efforts on firm power augmentation projects are called for here,
besides those on the usual IC additions.
One important causative factor of such low capacity utilization is
the poor technical efficiency, reinforced by an inability to attain and
assimilate significant technological progress over time. Technical
efficiency in generation in general is determined by plant availability
(which in turn is determined by forced outages), by plant load factor
(PLF), as also by auxiliary consumption. Forced outages occur when a
unit is thrown out of service due to unexpected causes such as breakdown,
equipment malfunction, etc., and are usually of a random nature.  These
outages generally befall on the operation side in generators, boilers,
turbines, and their auxiliaries. There are also electrical and mechanical
forced outages, due to poor quality of fuel, wet coal being supplied, and
lack of timely and proper maintenance practices that cause Grid system
faults, which are always avoidable. Units are also shut down at times for
planned preventive maintenance, intended to ensure their proper running
conditions, and also due to lack of adequate system load and of water in
reservoir in the case of hydro plants. Considerations of plant availability
factor and PLF are usually associated with analyses of technical efficiency
only of thermal power plants. Hydro plants are generally expected to be
much less prone to forced outages than thermal plants, and their
availability is expected to be open always and at maximum subject to
13
firm power capacity constraints. However, the hydro plants in Kerala
stand an exception to this expected rule, and also smart for higher forced
outage rates (FORs) and loss of load probability (Pillai 1991, 1999). The
FORs of the hydro system in Kerala (41 units of 11 plants) on an average
were as high as 17.71, 22.59, and 13.12 per cent respectively for the
three years of 1982-83 to 1984-85. In 1996-97, it was 8.96 per cent,
while the all-India average for thermal plants was 12.8 per cent. The
planned maintenance rate of the hydro-power system in Kerala on an
average was 12.88 per cent in the same year, and the reserve shut down
rate, 11.87 per cent, the latter being largely due to lack of water in storage.
The thermal systems of the other Southern States had much lower FORs.
Bihar, Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, and Orissa (till 1994-95) are some
of the States with very high FORs and hence much lower availability of
capacity (Table 3).
The availability factor is defined as unity less planned maintenance
rate (PMR) less forced outage rate (FOR); i.e., availability = 1 – (PMR +
FOR ).3   In 1997-98, the availability of thermal plants in India in general
was nearly 80 per cent, with 8 SEBs having availability higher than this
average, including all the three neighbours of Kerala in the South, Andhra
Pradesh being the topper (since 1995-96 onwards). The availability of
the Kerala hydro-power system is estimated at 78.16 per cent only for
1996-97, reflecting the undesirably higher extent of outages. Bihar’s has
been the worst affected SEB for a long time in this respect; Assam follows
suit. Delhi, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal are all in the red
(Table 3).
Load factor is generally defined as the ratio of average load to
maximum (or peak) load. More exactly, it  is  also  defined  as  the  ratio
of  energy consumed (average load) in a given period to energy which
would have  been  consumed, had the maximum demand been maintained
14
throughout that period. Extended  thus to a generating  unit,  plant load
factor (PLF) then refers to  the  ratio  of  the actual generation of that
plant to its maximum possible generation during a period (one year).
Remember that even if the plant is available with a high probability, it
may have at times to be backed down due to lack of adequate system
load (reserve shut down), and hence the actual generation of the plant
may fall short of availability. PLF is then defined in this vein also as
availability less reserve shut down rate. Thus the difference between
availability and PLF represents a safety margin, buffer, or  reserve margin,
with a demand- cushioning effect. A PLF very close to availability might
be misconstrued as reflecting better capacity utilization; such over-
exertion, however,would definitely tell upon the life of the plant, and
increase its ‘down’ chances. Hence, along with a higher availability, an
adequately high reserve margin also is desirably sought for. PLF also is
influenced by factors like age of the generating plant, quality of coal,
and its timely and adequate availability, shortcomings in energy
evacuation, and equipment deficiencies.
While the plant availability remained about 75 to 79 per cent in
the 8th Plan period, the average PLF of the thermal plants had a distinct
improvement from  55.3 per cent in 1991-92 to 64.7 per cent in 1997-98.
In that year, the PLF in the Central sector was nearly 71 per cent, and in
the Private sector, 71.1 per cent, while the all-SEBs average was only
60.9 per cent, ranging from 16.1 per cent of Bihar to 82 per cent of
Andhra Pradesh. Of the other two neighbours of Kerala, Karnataka had
a PLF of 75.2 per cent and Tamil Nadu, 68.1 per cent. Kerala hydro-
power system had an estimated PLF of 66.29 per cent in 1996-97. When
compared with availability, most of these rates are satisfactorily tolerable,
revealing at the same time  the outages that affect availability as the
important culprit in low levels of capacity utilization in India. It should
also be pointed out that the power plants in the State sector are in general
15
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much older than in the Central or Private sector, and the state of
maintenance of these units also remains very poor4 . A significant
determinant of the higher PLF in the Central sector has been an increasing
share, in their total IC, (now about 75 per cent) of 500 – 200 MW capacity
plants, with fluidized bed boiler (FBB) designs suited to the Indian coal
quality, whereas in the State sector such larger capacity plants constitute
less than 60 per cent of the total  IC only. Plants of lower capacity (120
MW and below), with an inappropriate boiler design (Czech), that cannot
handle Indian coal of high ash content, make up only 20 per cent of the
total IC in the Central sector, but as much as about 40 per cent in the
State sector, out of which almost 16 per cent make up plants with less
than 90 MW capacity (Table 4). In fact, there have been attempts that
attribute the increasing trend in the PLF in the Indian power sector in
general since the eighties to the introduction of larger capacity plants –
200 MW introduced in the late seventies, and 500 MW in the mid-
eighties5 . Some cases, however, invalidate this ‘size matters’ claim – for
example, in Punjab, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu  (in the
early nineties in the last two cases), where larger capacity plants (more
than 200 MW) predominate, the PLF trend was not satisfactory, whereas
Andhra Pradesh fared far better with much lower share of larger plants
than others6 . This reveals some still untapped quarters of improvement
available in many States. Side by side with the introduction of new vintage
plants of higher technical efficiency, proper and timely maintenance of
plants to ensure their healthy life also is indispensable. It has been
recognized that in many cases investments in long term rehabilitation
and re-powering of old plants fructify more promisingly than in installing
new generation capacity.
In addition to this technical inefficiency in energy generation is
the higher level of auxiliary consumption at generation end that eats into
17
Table  4: Capacity-wise Distribution of Thermal Plants - 1994-95
              Percentage  Distribution  of  Plants  by   MW   Size
   > 200 -   140 -   115 -    105 –  90 - < 90 Total
    210 150 120 110 110
Andhra Pradesh 59.1 0 0 20.7 0 20.2 100
Assam 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Bihar 0 0 0 66.2 7.7 26.1 100
Gujarat 57.8 7.1 18.2 0 0 16.9 100
Haryana 25.2 0 0 52.8 0 22 100
Jammu & Kashmir 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Karnataka 83.1 0 0 0 0 16.9 100
Madhya Pradesh 66.5 0 15.3 0 0 18.2 100
Maharashtra 72.4 4.4 9.5 6.9 0 6.8 100
Orissa 0 0 0 46.8 0 53.2 100
Punjab 74.1 0 0 25.9 0 0 100
Rajasthan 74.1 0 0 25.9 0 0 100
Tamil Nadu 79.9 0 0 14 0 6.1 100
Uttar Pradesh 52.3 0 0 21.6 7.4 18.7 100
West Bengal 60.7 0 19.8 0 0 19.5 100
All SEBs 59.2 1.8 7.3 13.8 1.6 16.3 100
Electricity Depts. 0 0 0 10.5 0 89.5 100
Central Sector 74.5 5.2 8.2 3.4 4.1 4.6 100
Private Sector 38.4 5.5 4.4 10.6 0 41.1 100
Total 62.4 3.2 7.4 9.8 2.4 14.8 100
Source:  Rao et al.  (1998-99),  Table  6.
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the energy available for transmission. Auxiliary consumption in the power
station depends upon its layout, operation conditions, automisation, and
design of various equipment.   Though taken to be of the order of 3 to 5
per cent in a modern thermal plant and 0.5 per cent in a hydro plant,
auxiliary consumption in India has been nearly 10 per cent over the years.
Reported as a weighted average of thermal and hydel plants in the State
sector, it remained in the range of around 7 per cent in the 8th Plan period.
Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal have had always much higher auxiliary
consumption – more than 10 per cent (Table 3). In Kerala, the trend in
auxiliary consumption has of late been on the rise, away from the
erstwhile satisfactory plane; it is expected to be so, as more and more
thermal plants come into operation.
T & D Losses
The energy sent out, net of auxiliary consumption, then fritters
away in transmission and distribution (T & D) network7   to such a
substantial extent that by the time it reaches the sales point, it would
often be only a smaller fraction of the net generation. Over 82 billion
units of electricity were lost in T & D in various States in India in 1997-
98. The losses increased from 19.8 per cent in 1992-93 to 23 per cent in
1996-97, and then declined marginally to 21.8 per cent in the next year
(Table 5). These are very high by international standards – compared
with less than 10 per cent in most of the developed economies and with
less than 15 per cent in many developing countries such as China (7 per
cent), Thailand (10 per cent), Argentina (12 per cent), and Chile (11 per
cent) (Rao, et  al. 1998-99: 42). In almost all the States the losses remain
very high, from 15.2 per cent in Maharashtra to 47.5 per cent in Jammu
& Kashmir in 1997-98. Delhi stands next to Jammu & Kashmir with 43
per cent; then Orissa (39 per cent), Haryana (32.2 per cent), Andhra
Pradesh (25 per cent), Assam (24 per cent), Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and
19
Rajasthan (23 per cent each). T & D losses in Kerala was in a satisfactorily
comparable position till some two decades back, the losses having been
less than 15 per cent. However, it increased to substantial extent in the
following years, averaging about 24 per cent during 1982-83 to 1996-
97. In 1997-98, it was 17.87 per cent, while for Andhra Pradesh, it was
25 per cent, for Karnataka, 18.4 per cent, and for Tamil Nadu, 17 per
cent.
The neglect of the T & D sector, especially the transmission sector,
in terms of adequate investments in capacity and maintenance, and the
lack of systematic T & D planning over the years are the major technical
factors contributing to the high level of T & D losses. Defective metering,
unmetered supply and pilferage are the main non-technical factors. There
has been over the years a pronounced bias in investment in favour of
augmenting generation capacity to the utter neglect of the 1:1 norm in
investment in generation and T & D sectors. Despite the increased  funds
allocation given to T & D sector in the recent past, out of the belated
recognition of the compounded effects of neglect, under-utilization or
diversion of funds (meant especially for transmission capacity
augmentation) into generation and/or distribution sector still plagues the
system. Increase in demand by an increasing number of consumers vis-
à-vis inadequate T & D capacity has resulted in heavy overload on the
system, causing substantial line losses. During the period 1970-71 to
1996-97, the number of consumers increased by 7.26 per cent per annum,
and IC, though restricted, by about 7 per cent, while the annual growth
in transmission lines was 4.55 per cent and distribution (low tension,
LT) lines, 6.15 per cent. The ratio of the length of transmission lines to
the length of distribution lines dropped from 7.73 per cent in 1970-71 to
5.2 per cent in 1996-97; in 1990-91, it was only 4.78 per cent. Evidently,
the imbalance between the two has been on the rise, worsening the
overload problem. Where domestic load is more spread out, as in Kerala,
20
large-capacity distribution transformers demand large lengths of LT line,
resulting in increased line losses. Larger number of small transformers
is more desirable in such situations; this is possible only with substantial
increase in 11 kV (or above) lines. However, the 11 kV lines to LT lines
ratio which was about 1:1 in 1951 in Kerala, for example, has now fallen
to 1:5 (in 1997-98). The ratio of the length of 15/11 kV lines to that of LT
lines was 1:2 in 1996-97 in India. At the same time, transformation losses
are higher for small-capacity transformers; in a 200 kVA transformer, it
has been found, iron loss is 0.28 per cent, and copper loss is 1.67 per
cent, while in a 25 kVA transformer, the losses are respectively 0.75 per
cent and 3.5 per cent (Shah, Dalal, and Patel  1985). Three-phase lines
instead of the common one-phase line would also reduce the T & D loss
considerably (by more than one-sixth). The nominal transmission (extra
high voltage, EHV) lines in vogue in India are of high-voltage direct
current (HVDC), 400 kV, 230/220 kV, 110 kV, and 66 kV. HVDC lines
have been so far introduced by the Andhra Pradesh SEB (37 circuit km.)
and the Central sector in Northern region (1630 ckt. km.) only, and 400
kV lines by the SEBs of Punjab, Uttat Pradesh, West Bengal, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Bihar, and Orissa, besides
the Central Sector. The low voltage 132/110/90 kV lines predominate
the transmission sector in the proportion of 400 kV : 230/220 kV : 132/
110/90 kV =  0.36 : 0.81: 1 (as in 1996-97). Similarly, the low tension
(LT) distribution lines predominate over the high voltage ones in the
proportion of 33/22 kV : 15/11 kV : 6.6/3.3/2.2 kV : LT =
0.077:0.49:0.0015:1. The proportion of LT lines to EHV lines is just 1 :
0.07. In Kerala, the proportion of 220 kV : 110 kV : 66kV : 11 kV : LT in
1997-98 was 0.013 : 0.019 : 0.0195 : 0.195 : 1, and the proportion of LT
lines to EHV lines was 1 : 0.032, more than double the all-India average.
Since a predominantly low voltage network characterizes the Indian
power sector in general, higher technical line losses and poor quality of
21
electricity at user ends are an inescapable fact. In fact, the low-voltage-
low-frequency profile common in many States is an easy option of escape
route for mitigating the power deficit, which would get aggravated with
any attempt to raise the voltage level in the basic system without adequate
additions to generating capacity.  In this respect, the tie up of a State
Grid with a Regional Grid that operates at low system frequency due to
overload further reduces quality. For example, the Southern Grid, with
which Kerala system is tied up, runs at a low frequency up to even 47.5
Hz instead of the normal 50 Hz. The low voltage conditions in turn lead
to the use of step-up transformers or voltage stabilizers by consumers,
which in turn induces high inductive load and further worsens the
conditions.
Even the SEBs that report lower losses (e.g., Maharashtra) have to
improve further to attain standards of efficient systems abroad; yet a
large potential for energy and capacity savings is available if all SEBs
could bring losses down at least to these levels e.g., of Maharashtra). Let
us assume such a situation – that T & D losses are only 15 per cent of the
energy available in India. Then in 1997-98, the losses would be only
59,443.13 MU, instead of the actual 82,462.9 MU, giving a potential
saving in energy of 23,019.78 MU and in revenue of Rs. 42,466.88
million, at an average rate of Rs. 1.845 per unit. This brings out the
immense cost of the avoidable inefficiency in the Indian T & D sector –
a revenue loss of around Rs. 4,000 crores every year ! Moreover, the
energy thus lost in excess of the notional 15 per cent in fact represents a
generating capacity of about 4,380 MW at 60 per cent load factor. It
means that if the T & D system in India could maintain the energy loss at
least at 15 per cent per annum, it could then help dispense with the need
for adding about 4,000 MW to the installed capacity, saving immensely
in investment and working capital costs. That these savings were in
addition to the potential increase in sales revenue by around Rs. 4,000
22
Ta
bl
e 
 5
: T
 
&
 D
 L
os
s a
s P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 A
v
a
ila
bl
e
 
 
 
 
 
AC
GR
 (%
)
Th
ef
t /
 M
isu
se
 C
as
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(19
96
-97
)
19
70
-7
1
19
80
-8
1
19
90
-9
1
19
97
-9
8
19
70
-9
8
Nu
m
be
r
Lo
ss
 (M
U)
An
dh
ra
 P
ra
de
sh
25
.42
22
.6
22
.4
25
.0
-
0.0
6
25
68
1
61
.81
Ar
un
ac
ha
l P
ra
de
sh
NA
24
.0
20
.0
30
.0
1.3
2*
.
.
.
.
As
sa
m
17
.68
19
.3
24
.1
24
.0
1.1
4
57
9
NF
Bi
ha
r
22
.85
22
.1
21
.1
23
.0
0.0
2
67
5
0.3
8
De
lh
i  
(D
VB
)
11
.07
18
.4
24
.9
43
.0
5.1
5
NF
NF
Go
a
18
.09
25
.7
25
.0
26
.0
1.3
5
.
.
.
.
Gu
jar
at
14
.52
19
.8
23
.7
18
.0
0.8
0
46
24
1
0.0
2
Ha
ry
an
a
27
.94
22
.6
27
.5
32
.2
0.5
3
NF
NF
Hi
m
ac
ha
l P
ra
de
sh
12
.23
19
.3
21
.5
17
.4
1.3
1
15
29
0.1
3
Ja
m
m
u &
 K
as
hm
ir
21
.66
48
.1
42
.3
47
.5
2.9
5
NF
NF
Ka
rn
ata
ka
14
.62
24
.6
20
.1
18
.4
0.8
6
18
4
3.0
0
Ke
ra
la
12
.80
14
.2
21
.6
17
.9
1.2
4
18
13
3.3
4
M
ad
hy
a P
ra
de
sh
14
.69
22
.3
24
.9
19
.0
0.9
6
24
51
85
15
0.6
8
M
ah
ar
as
ht
ra
13
.67
16
.2
18
.1
15
.2
0.3
9
61
42
42
.35
M
an
ip
ur
NA
55
.6
28
.0
21
.5
(-)
5.4
4*
.
.
.
.
M
eg
ha
lay
a
NA
9.1
11
.8
16
.9
3.7
1*
65
4
0.7
2
(T
a
bl
e 
5 
co
nt
d.
...
...
.)
23
 
 
 
 
 
AC
GR
 (%
)
Th
ef
t /
 M
isu
se
 C
as
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(19
96
-97
)
19
70
19
80
-8
1
19
90
-9
1
19
97
-9
8
19
70
-9
8
Nu
m
be
r
Lo
ss
 (M
U)
M
izo
ra
m
NA
22
.2
29
.6
26
.0
0.9
3*
.
.
.
.
Na
ga
lan
d
NA
23
.1
26
.1
29
.0
1.3
5*
.
.
.
.
Or
iss
a
6.1
5
19
.2
25
.3
39
.0
7.
08
84
5
3.1
6
Pu
nja
b
22
.38
19
.6
19
.0
18
.0
(-)
0.8
0
70
92
4
21
7.4
1
Ra
jas
tha
n
13
.11
26
.6
25
.9
23
.0
2.1
0
53
21
8
11
3.9
9
Si
kk
im
NA
22
.9
24
.5
20
.0
(-)
0.7
9*
.
.
.
.
Ta
m
il 
Na
du
17
.67
19
.1
18
.7
17
.0
-
0.1
4
77
4
NF
Tr
ip
ur
a
NA
31
.5
29
.6
29
.8
(-)
0.3
3*
.
.
.
.
Ut
tar
 P
ra
de
sh
24
.49
15
.6
26
.9
23
.0
-
0.2
3
NF
NF
W
es
t B
en
ga
l
10
.18
13
.7
21
.8
19
.7
2.4
8
82
49
17
.72
Al
l I
nd
ia
17
.55
20
.6
22
.9
21
.8
0.8
1
46
26
93
61
4.7
1
No
te:
   
* 
 =
  w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 1
98
0-
81
;  
NF
  =
 N
ot
 F
ur
ni
sh
ed
 (to
 CE
A)
.
So
ur
ce
:1
97
0-
71
, 1
98
0-
81
 an
d 
19
90
-9
1, 
CM
IE
, E
ne
rg
y, 
M
ar
ch
 - 
Ap
ril
  1
99
9, 
an
d 
Ba
sic
 S
ta
tis
tic
s R
ela
tin
g 
to
 th
e  
In
di
an
  E
co
no
my
, 
 
(di
ffe
re
nt
vo
lu
m
es
);  
19
97
-98
 an
d 1
99
8-9
9 f
rom
 Pl
ann
ing
 Co
mm
iss
ion
  (G
OI
),  
Ap
ril
, 1
99
9;
fo
r  
Ke
ra
la,
 K
SE
B,
 P
ow
er
 Sy
ste
m 
St
at
ist
ics
; l
as
t t
wo
 co
lu
m
ns
, f
ro
m
 C
EA
, 
 P
ub
lic
 E
lec
tri
cit
y S
up
pl
y, 
Ge
ne
ra
l  
Re
vie
w,
 1
99
6-
97
.
(T
a
bl
e 
5 
co
nt
in
ue
d.
...
..)
24
crores per year speaks volumes for the gravity of the problem. Now just
reflect upon a drop in T & D losses to the ideal 10 per cent norm. It must,
however, be noted here that the non-technical energy losses due to theft,
etc., cannot be  converted  into  energy  and  capacity  savings,  but  can
only  be  included  in revenue savings. Though theft of electricity has
been made a cognizable offence since 1986 under the Indian Electricity
Act, 19108 , this has had no effect on the theft problem. Some of the
SEBs are reported to conduct checks and detect cases of theft or misuse
of electricity. Some estimates of energy lost in pilferage/misuse are also
available – e.g., in Karnataka, as much as 16.3 thousand units of electricity
are estimated to have lost per case of theft/misuse detected in 1996-97,
and in Gujarat, only 0.43 units per case detected. In Kerala, the loss was
estimated at 1,842.3 units per case detected, in Maharashtra, as much as
6,895.1 units per case, and in Punjab, 3,065.4 units per case (Table 5).
On an average, in 1996-97, an estimated quantum of about 1,332 units
of electricity was lost per case of theft/misuse detected in 13 States.
Though under-estimates, these figures do represent a big drain on the
SEBs’ revenue stream. The estimated revenue loss for the 13 States in
1996-97 in this respect amounted to Rs. 100.19 crores at an average rate
of Rs. 1.63/unit, and for Punjab alone, Rs. 29.63 crores, at Rs. 1.36/unit.
Data are unavailable/withheld on the estimates of energy loss in theft in
some SEBs, where in fact pilferage is a major problem, for example,
Delhi, with no rural electrification commitment that involves high T &
D loss.
T & D Losses – An Underestimate
There is little doubt that even these high figures of T & D losses
are only underestimates that find a suitable cover-up in the overestimates
of agricultural consumption. In most of the States, agricultural
consumption is largely unmetered, and the SEBs, in their eager to record
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reduced transit losses, find this situation a convenient ‘dump’ for a good
part of the unaccounted-for energy.  We can have a rough estimate of
such diversion. The energy consumption per energized pump-set in the
agricultural sector, (that accounts for about 30 per cent of total electricity
consumption), of India in 1997-98 was 7,492.4 units. In Tamil Nadu,
where most of the agricultural consumption, accounting for about 27
per cent of total consumption, is metered, consumption per energized
pump-set in that year was only 4,471.05 units. In 1996-97, average
electricity consumption per energized pump-set in India was 7,264.72
units and in Tamil Nadu, 4,425.46 units per set. It may not be unreasonable
then to assume that the power consumption in general in the agricultural
sector in India is around 4,000 – 4,500 units per energized pump-set.
This in turn implies that about 40 per cent of what is branded as
agricultural consumption,  estimated as a residual after setting the target
for T & D loss (reduction), accounts for unaccounted-for energy. The
estimate is of course, a rough one, as it ignores the differences in capacity,
efficiency, and duration of use of the pump-sets on the farm across the
country: still it drives home the essential point of the cover-up. Comparing
energy consumption per kW of connected load (CL) in the agricultural
sector would be a better method, though it too suffers from the problems
of differences in efficiency and duration of use, etc. We have, however,
tried out that also. The average electricity consumption per kW of CL in
the agricultural sector in India in 1996-97 was 1,866.36 units/kW, and
that in Tamil Nadu, 1,287.2 units/kW, indicating that, by this definition,
a little over 30 per cent of what is reported as agricultural consumption
in India represents unaccounted-for energy. If we consider consumption
per agricultural consumer, it was 7,444.21 units in India in 1996-97, and
4,711.71 units in Tamil Nadu, showing that about 37 per cent of the
reported agricultural consumption in India must be included in the
unaccounted-for energy category. Thus there is no gainsaying the fact
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that the so-called agricultural consumption in India is an over-estimate
by as much as 30 to 40 per cent – an easy cover up of the large quantum
of energy losses. The actual T & D loss in India inclusive of this then
amounts to about 31 to 29 per cent, instead of the reported 21.8 per cent
in 1997-98. Now, considering an actual 30 per cent T & D loss (including
unaccounted for energy) and proceeding with the assumption of the Indian
power supply system attaining a standard level of 15 per cent loss only,
we find, in 1997-98, a potential saving in energy to the tune of 59,443
MU and in revenue of Rs. 10,966 crores at an average rate of Rs. 1.85
per unit. The potential energy saving represents a generating capacity of
nearly 11,310 MW at 60 per cent load factor. So much is the cost of
inefficiency in one aspect (T & D) of the electricity supply in India !
Power Purchase
A good part of the net generation, itself falling short of demand,
thus being lost in transit, power purchase from other States and Central
sector perforce increases more than is required otherwise. In 1997-98,
energy import by SEBs ranged from 16.5 per cent of the total energy
sales in Meghalaya to as much as 164 per cent in Orissa. Bihar (109 per
cent), Karnataka (116 per cent), Delhi (147.5 per cent), Jammu & Kashmir
(156.5 per cent), West Bengal (89 per cent) and Assam (79 per cent)
were the other major importers (Table 6). The appalling situation of
having to resort to energy purchase much in excess of cent per cent, as in
the case of the above five SEBs, means that their auxiliary consumption
and other losses of energy far exceeded their own generation to cut down
even the costly purchase itself. For an instance, in the case of Delhi in
1997-98, total energy sold was only 67.8 per cent of the energy imported;
in other words, about 32 per cent of the energy purchased plus the whole
of its own generation were lost ! In the same year in Orissa, total energy
sales were only 61 per cent of the energy purchase, and the losses, the
27
whole generation plus 39 per cent of the purchase ! Other (14) States
were able to convert in varying degrees their own generation into sales
revenue; in West Bengal, only 10.2 per cent of the energy generated
went into sales stream (plus the whole purchase, the remaining having
been lost); and in Meghalaya, as much as 76.5 per cent, in 1997-98.
Kerala had to import about 55 per cent of energy needed to meet her
consumers’ demand, in addition to about 67 per cent of her own generation
in that year. That also means about 33 per cent of energy generated was
lost in auxiliary consumption and in transit.
Energy Consumption
Thus the Indian power sector, characterized by inadequate capacity,
its under-utilization, and high level of losses, remains poor in its supply.
Being one of the world’s lowest, per capita consumption of electricity in
India was only 283 units in 1993 as against 2,761 units of Venezuela,
1,627 units of Chile, 1,479 units of Uruguay, 1,463 units of Brazil, 1,438
units of Argentina, and 1,072 units of Mexico (Council of Power Utilities
1997).  In 1996-97, it just reached 338 units, with the Western region
having the maximum of 521 units and the North eastern region, the lowest,
107 units. In the Southern region, Kerala has always had the lowest per
capita consumption, always lower than the all-India average also. One
of the reasons for this , besides the restricted energy supply, is the high
density of population per sq. Km.  in Kerala, which is more than double
of all-India average. The same low level profile is seen for Kerala in
terms of electricity consumption per connected consumer also – it was
only 1.41 thousand units in 1996-97 as against the Southern region
average of 2.09 thousand units and the all-India average of 2.95 thousand
units. Bihar enjoyed the highest average consumption level per consumer
of 5.4 thousand units and Nagaland had to be contented with only 1.04
thousand units. India stand poor in terms of the average connected load
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(CL) also, with only 1.97 kW per consumer in 1996-97. While as many
as 11 States had higher average CL than the all-India average, no State
in the Southern region came closer to this, with Kerala having only 1.23
kW of CL per consumer .
A significant change over time in the composition of electricity
consumption by customer categories is discernible in almost all the States
in terms of increasing share in total consumption of the domestic and
agricultural consumers at the cost of industrial as also commercial
consumers. At the all-India level, share of the domestic sector increased
from 10.8 per cent in 1970-71 to 18.4 per cent  in  1998-99,  and  of  the
agriculture  from about 10 per cent to 30 per cent during the same period,
whereas the share of the industry dropped from 61.6 per cent to 33.7 per
cent and of the commercial sector from 7.2 per cent to about 5 per cent
during this period. Kerala witnessed the most dramatic behaviour in these
trends – an 11-fold increase in the share of domestic sector to account
for nearly 50 per cent of the total electricity consumption in the State,
and a 50 per cent fall in that of industry to account for about 33 per cent
of total consumption. No other State in India (barring Manipur and
Tripura) has such a domestic-sector-dominant composition of power
consumption. Kerala also is one among the very few States (Orissa, Uttar
Pradesh, and West Bengal) where the commercial sector prospered to
some extent. In most of the other States, agriculture and/or industry
account for the major share in total power consumption (Table 7), with
agriculture enjoying the highest share in total consumption, with an
average of nearly 40 per cent, in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. However, the increase
in the share of agricultural consumption should be taken with a pinch of
salt, since in most of the States, as already explained, it just represents
the residual, that remains after accounting for all other sectors’
consumption and the ‘targeted’ losses. That the increase in the share of
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the agricultural consumption in Tamil Nadu, where it is mostly metered,
was from 24.8 per cent in 1970-71 to just 27 per cent in 1998-99 does in
fact lend enough strength to this contention. Moreover, the very high T
& D loss percentage reported, for example, for Delhi, where agricultural
consumption is very minimal and thus offers no convenient ‘dump’ for
unaccounted-for energy, also supports our argument9 .
In addition to this low level of electricity consumption (even per
customer), electricity supply industry in India is characterized by low
level of accessibility – by 1991 Census, only about 42 per cent of the
households in India had electricity facility, with wide rural (38.5 per
cent) – urban (75.8 per cent) disparity.  The lowest accessibility was in
Bihar,  with  only  12.6  per  cent  of  the  households  having  been
electrified  and  as many as 94 per cent of the rural households remaining
unelectrified (Table 8).  In Kerala, the percentage of households
electrified, according to 1991 Census, was only 48 per cent, even though
she achieved the target of cent per cent village electrification long back
(in May 1979).  However, as per a recent survey (Zachariah, et al. 1999:
198), conducted in 1998, 74  per cent of the households have electricity
facility in Kerala. This explains partly the rapid increase in the share of
domestic consumption in Kerala.  The Prasad Working Group on Energy,
appointed by the Government of India (1979) opined long back that
village electrification is very deceptive as an index of rural electrification.
That in many States, electricity still remains inaccessible to more than
20 to 25 per cent of the urban households, even though the cost of
providing connection in the urban areas is minimal, is a pointer to the
sluggish growth of this industry.
Institutional and Organizational Inefficiency
Besides these taut constraints upon the technical efficiency of the
power sector in India are the institutional and organizational factors.
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Though the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, requires the SEBs to function
as an autonomous corporation, their actual position is as good as that of
a State government department. Excessive interference in the affairs of
the SEBs by the State governments, in their careerist pursuit of
patronizing the social security concerns, has resulted, for one example,
in over-employment in the SEBs, especially and more unwarrentedly, in
administration section. The number of employees per MU of energy
sold in India in 1990-91 was about 5 (implying a labour productivity of
0.2 MU per employee),  while it was 0.2  (or 5 MU per employee or 25
times higher than that in India) in Chile, Norway, and USA, about 0.6
(or 1.7 MU per employee) in New Zealand, Argentina, and UK, and less
than 2.5 (or 0.4 MU per employee) in some developing countries such
as China, Philippines, and Indonesia (Rao et al. 1998-99: 42-43). Though
the ratio declined marginally to 3.6 in 1996-97, still higher than the
standards abroad, wide disparity prevails across the States, from 41.4 in
Arunachal Pradesh to 1.9 in Gujarat (Table 9). Kerala had a ratio (3.8)
somewhat corresponding to the all-India average, and slightly higher
than her neighbours. The States like Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Madhya Pradesh, etc., where there is a significant component of thermal
generation, which entails substantially more manpower than required
for hydro-generation, had higher labour productivity than Kerala with a
pure hydro system. The over-manning problem is acute in the Special
Category States of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and the North-
Eastern States. Number    of     employees     per    thousand   consumers
in India was 13.3 in 1992-93, which dropped to 11.2 in 1996-97.     Kerala
had    the  lowest   ratio   during    all   these   years   with 6.1 in 1992-93
and 5.5 in 1996-97. Karnataka with 5.9 in 1996-97 stood next to Kerala.
Arunachal Pradesh had the highest ratio in this respect also, with all
other Special Category States having higher ratios.
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Table 9:  Some of the  Performance Indicators
Employees   per   MU   of Employees   per   Thousand
Energy Sold Consumers
  1992-93  1996-97 ACGR (%) 1992-93 1996-97  ACGR (%)
Andhra Pradesh 3.7 3.3 -2.82 9.0 7.7 -3.83
Arunachal Pradesh 71.4 41.4 -12.74 50.0 45.6 -2.28
Assam 14.6 10.3 -8.35 38.8 28.4 -7.50
Bihar 7.6 5.5 -7.77 26.0 19.2 -7.30
Delhi (DESU) 3.3 3.5 1.48 14.2 12.6* - 2.94*
Goa 6.0 4.6 -6.43 12.7 11.6 -2.24
Gujarat 2.5 1.9 -6.63 8.3 7.9 -1.23
Haryana 5.2 5.3 0.48 15.8 14.6 -1.96
Himachal Pradesh 6.8 5.2 -6.49 11.0 11.5 1.12
Jammu & Kashmir 10.8 9.2 -3.93 26.1 26.8 0.66
Karnataka 4.1 2.9 -8.29 7.0 5.9 -4.18
Kerala 4.1 3.8 -1.88 6.1 5.5 -2.56
Madhya Pradesh 4.9 3.7 -6.78 13.8 11.9 -3.64
Maharashtra 3.5 2.6 -7.16 12.0 9.7 -5.18
Manipur 28.9 20.1 -8.68 52.0 44.3 -3.93
Meghalaya 10.8 9.5 -3.16 51.1 39.3 -6.35
Mizoram 17.2 9.0 -14.95 21.0 16.1 -6.43
Nagaland 38.4 29.0 -6.78 40.8 33.5 -4.81
Orissa 6.1 5.5 -2.56 30.0 23.5 -5.92
Pondicherry 2.2 2.1 -1.16 11.0 10.0 -2.35
Punjab 5.0 4.1 -4.84 17.9 15.8 -3.07
Rajasthan 5.3 4.0 -6.79 16.1 12.4 -6.32
Sikkim 24.3 15.7 -10.35 41.0 27.0 -9.92
Tamil Nadu 5.0 3.5 -8.53 10.4 8.2 -5.77
Tripura 30.4 18.8 -11.32 46.0 34.8 -6.74
Uttar Pradesh 4.4 3.5 -5.56 18.7 14.7 -5.84
West Bengal 6.7 3.9 -12.65 22.3 14.7 -9.89
All India 4.6 3.6 -5.94 13.3 11.2 -4.21
Note: * = for (with respect to) 1995-96.
Source: Planning Commission, Annual Report on the Working of SEBs & EDs,  Various
Issues.
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Another institutional factor breeding inefficiency has been the lack
of professional management with commitment, accountability, inclination
and initiative in decision making. A steady enervating  erosion  of
competitive  management  values has sapped the institutional texture to
the bottom, giving rise to all-round X-inefficiency. For one thing,
continuity of management by top personnel at the policy making level
has been a perpetual loss. In most of the SEBs, the average tenure of
Chairmen and Chief Engineers is very limited – for an example, four
Chairmen of KSEB in 1973-74 had tenures less than one year, out of
which one of them had less than three months (Government of Kerala,
1984: 41). The new Chairman of the KSEB, who has recently taken
charge, is the fourth in four years. Similarly, there were five incumbents
on the chair of Chief Engineer (Planning) of the KSEB in a period of six
years during 1978 to 1984 (Government of Kerala 1984: 41). The story
still continues and is the same with other SEBs also. The appointments
being mostly on seniority basis, by the time a person reaches the top
chair, he would be on the verge of superannuation, that retards his
commitment and involvement in serious policy making.  Committees
after committees have recommended that appointments be made based
on selection, and that the selected person with proven ability and integrity
should have at least 2 to 5 years further service for superannuation
(Government of Kerala, 1984: 41– 42; Government of Kerala, 1997:
57–58).
Moreover, the socio-political dynamics in different States have
led to a situation of wide-spread corrupt practices of nepotism, all at the
cost of merit, ability, and efficiency. A general lethargic indisposition
for accountability booms under such umbrellas of patronage. “Certainly
improved worker selection could improve productivity at the plant level.
To the extent that people are not working at what they are most proficient
at, productivity should rise as a consequence of superior selection
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methods”  (Leibenstein, 1976: 38).  Leibenstein’s  analysis  of  internal
motivation  to  efficiency  starts  from  the premise  that  contracts  for
labour  supply  within  the  firm  are  incomplete, they  do  not include a
specification of the job, so the efficiency of the labour depends on the
motivation to effort, which by all counts is constrained by his preference
for less effort, confined in an ‘inert area’. This problem is more acute in
the public sector of many developing countries, where loose contract, if
at all any, guarantees job security till superannuation, whatsoever be the
output of his effort. “Since there are no professional job descriptions,
personnel are often assigned to areas for which they are not
competent…..People are hired against general specifications and not
specific job needs….Employees do not have a clear understanding of
their responsibilities. Positions do not have performance
objectives…(and) clearly defined selection criteria for recruitment
purposes.” (Government of Kerala, 1998: 5.4).  Besides the superior
selection procedure, linking the terms of job continuity and remuneration
to productivity would certainly yield a sea of change.
3. Cost Analysis
All these inefficiencies must come out in inflated proportion in
the cost of electricity supply. For all the SEBs in India, the unit cost of
supply of electricity in 1974-75 was 22.5 paise per unit, which increased
to 41.9 paise per unit in 1980-81 (at an annual average compound growth
rate of 10.9 per cent), and further to 108.6 paise per unit in 1990-91 (at
an annual rate of 10 per cent). The nineties saw sharp rise in the unit cost
of supply, from 116.8 paise/unit in 1991-92 to 227.89 paise/unit in 1997-
98 (at a rate of 11.8 per cent p. a.). It is expected to reach Rs. 2.43/unit in
1998-99 (an increase of 6.6 per cent). In 1997-98, the unit cost varied
from Rs. 1.60/unit in Himachal Pradesh  to Rs. 4.23/unit in Assam. Two
important factors that cause such wide variation in unit supply cost in
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general are (i) the source of power, whether hydro or thermal, and (ii)
the coverage of electrification of villages and households. The pure hydro-
power systems of Himachal Pradesh and Meghalaya have lower unit
cost; however, the higher unit cost of the pure thermal systems of Delhi
and Assam is not due to higher fuel cost, but due to higher power purchase
cost. Though Kerala is still a hydro-power dominant system, her unit
cost of supply (Rs. 1.92/unit) exceeds that of Karnataka (Rs. 1.89/unit),
now a thermal-power dominant (72 per cent) system, on account of the
increased share of imported (thermal) power. If we take into account
this aspect also, i.e., the sources of total energy sold out, Kerala power
system would become a predominantly thermal (about 80 per cent) one.
During the seventies, the average cost of electricity supply in Kerala had
an annual average compound growth rate of 3.8 per cent, during the
eighties, 11.8 per cent, and during 1991-92 to 1997-98, 15.4 per cent,
reflecting largely the increasing impact of power purchase cost.
The major components of electricity supply cost are (i) the revenue
expenditure, consisting of expenditure on fuel, power purchase, operation
and maintenance (O & M), establishment and administration (E & A),
and on other miscellanies; and (ii) the fixed costs, including depreciation
and interest payable to institutional creditors and to the concerned  State
Governments.
Fuel Cost
Fuel cost has accounted for about 25 per cent of the total supply
cost since 1992-93. Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Punjab have
had fuel cost share higher than the all-India average, while the pure
thermal systems of Assam and Delhi, much lower (Table 10). Fuel cost
depends, besides other factors, on the specific consumption of coal and
oil, and the transportation costs of these fuels. The specific coal
consumption of the thermal plants of the SEBs has been about 0.74 to
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0.78 kg/unit since 1992-93. A number of SEBs, including that of Andhra
Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and Uttar
Pradesh, have had consistently higher than 0.8 kg/unit of coal
consumption during this period. The specific secondary oil consumption
in the coal-based thermal plants increased steeply from 7.8 ml/unit in
1992-93 to 10.8 ml/unit in 1995-96, and then dropped to reach 9.9 ml/
unit in 1997-98. In the late seventies and the early eighties, it was over
12 ml/unit. The average specific oil consumption in Bihar, Haryana, and
Assam has been higher than the all-India average, while that in Andhra
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh (recently)
and Punjab, much lower. The cost of coal per unit of electricity generation
increased from 53.4 paise/unit in 1992-93 to 89.4 paise/unit in 1997-98
(at an annual growth rate of 10.9 per cent), and that of secondary oil
from 3.7 paise/unit to 7.3 paise/unit (at an annual rate of 14.6 per cent)
during this period (Government of India, 1999: Annexures 4.9 – 4.12).
The States, viz., Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan,
located farther away from coal fields have to bear higher cost of coal per
unit of generation, thus having higher share of fuel component  in their
unit cost.
Much remains to be desired and improved in the aspect of overall
thermal efficiency of the steam power plants also. 25 out of the 77 steam
power stations considered in the country, accounting for 19.4 per cent of
their total IC (of 50,115.48 MW) in 1996-97, reported an overall thermal
efficiency below 25 per cent, and an average capacity utilization of 3,975
kWh/kW or 45.4 per cent.  19 steam stations, representing 24.2 per cent
of the IC, had an overall thermal efficiency in the range of 25 to 30 per
cent, and an average capacity utilization of 4,377.6 kWh/kW or about 50
per cent; and the remaining 33, with 56.4 per cent of IC, had, above 30
per cent overall thermal efficiency, and an average capacity utilization
of 6,164.4 kWh/kW or 70.4 per cent. The average utilization rate for all
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the 77 stations was 5,307.6 kWh/kW  or 60.6 per cent (Government of
India, 1996-97: Table No. 45). Thus about 57 per cent of these steam
stations, accounting for about 44 per cent of their total IC, were utilized
for less than 50 per cent of the time, and all the stations together, about
60 per cent.
Costs of Power Purchase
Expenditure on power purchase is the largest component of the
total cost of electricity supply. It increased from 27.9 per cent of the unit
cost of supply of electricity in 1992-93 to 36.2 per cent in 1997-98 (at an
annual growth rate of 5.3 per cent). Bihar, Delhi, Haryana, Jammu and
Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa and West Bengal have
much higher proportion of power import cost than the all-India average;
as much as 74 per cent of the unit cost of supply in Delhi was accounted
for by power purchase in 1997-98, and nearly 70 per cent in Orissa. The
average rate of payment for power purchase steadily increased from 76
paise/unit in 1992-93 to Rs. 1.39/unit in 1997-98 (at an annual rate of
12.7 per cent). In 1997-98, the total cost of power purchased by all the
SEBs and Electricity Departments (EDs) was Rs. 24,187.4 crores. A good
part of this huge cost in fact represents the price paid for the inefficiency
in the T & D system. We can have an estimate of this inefficiency that
stands to inflate the unit cost of electricity supply. The net generation of
electricity by all the SEBs and EDs in 1997-98 is estimated to be
2,28,020.3  MU. If we assume that the T & D loss could be kept at a
minimum of 15 per cent, then the energy that must be available for a sale
of 2,93,478.9 MU in that year would be 3,45,269.3 MU, thus necessitating
an import of 1,17,248.99 MU (about 40 per cent of the total sales) only,
instead of the reported 1,74,373.9 MU (about 60 per cent of the sales),
giving a saving in power purchase of 57,124.9 MU, or in power purchase
cost of Rs. 7,924 crores at an average power purchase rate of Rs. 1.39/
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unit, or a saving of 27 paise per unit sold10 . This would reduce the unit
cost of electricity supply to Rs. 2.01 per unit sold, against the reported
Rs. 2.28/unit. Thus the cost of inefficiency in the T & D system alone
comes out to be about 27 paise per unit of electricity sold ! In the case of
Kerala, this is 6.16 paise per unit sold, and the unit cost of supply would
then be only Rs. 1.86/unit instead of the given Rs. 1.92/unit. Remember,
Kerala reported a T & D loss of 17.87 per cent only in 1997-98.  On the
other hand, for Delhi, the cost of inefficiency comes to 94.36 paise/unit
sold, and the unit cost of supply, Rs. 2.57/unit, instead of 3.51/unit !
The burden of power purchase could still be lessened if the SEBs
and EDs were able to improve their operational efficiency and thus
increase their net generation. The above analysis was based on the actual
figures on an average of a PLF of about 50 per cent (i.e., a utilization of
71.3 per cent at 70 per cent availability), and about 7 per cent of auxiliary
consumption for all the SEBs and EDs. At 80 per cent availability, the
thermal power generation in 1997-98 in the State sector implies a
utilization of 69.4 per cent (and hence a PLF of 55.5 per cent); and at an
(assumed) availability (dependable firm power) of 60 per cent, the hydro
power generation implies a utilization of 61.45 per cent (a PLF of about
37 per cent). Now, it would be only reasonable to assume a PLF of 70
per cent (that may imply a utilization of 87.5 per cent at 80 per cent
availability) for the thermal plants in the State’s sector11 . Similarly, let
the hydro power stations have a PLF of 47.5 per cent (that may imply a
utilization of nearly 80 per cent at 60 per cent availability). This increased
operational efficiency would reduce the power purchase (of 1997-98)
by 1,05,186.4 MU, assuming 7 per cent auxiliary and 15 per cent T & D
consumption. This represents a saving in power purchase cost of Rs.
14,590.4 crores or 49.72 paise per unit sold, and the unit cost of electricity
supply would be only Rs. 1.78 per unit ! For Delhi, such operational
efficiency improvement would reduce the unit supply cost by as much
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as 116.91 paise per unit sold to Rs. 2.34/unit, and for Kerala, by 40.32
paise per unit to Rs. 1.52/unit, assuming  0.61 per cent of auxiliary
consumption as reported !
Needless to repeat, adequate and timely capacity additions could
further improve the situation. If, for example, Kerala could achieve her
targets of commissioning of power plants as anticipated during the 7th,
8th and 9th Plans (as detailed in Government of Kerala 1984: Statement
2), she could still continue to enjoy being a net exporter, rather than be,
as at present, one of the States worst affected by power shortage. For
one thing, on the surface,  the failure ‘was apparently attributable to the
complacency created out of the comfortable power position prevailing
in Kerala until the recent failure of monsoon and the consequent power
cut’ (Government of Kerala 1984: 26). Deep-rooted, however, a number
of factors have in accumulation wreaked havoc on the system. Some
‘classical’ examples of project time-overruns may rightly be credited to
Kerala – Kallada (15 MW), Kakkad (50 MW), and Lower Periyar (180
MW), as also some minor projects (all hydro power projects), to have
been commissioned during the 7th Plan, could finally be put on line in
the mid-90s only. The time overrun (over and above the originally
scheduled commissioning date, once the works started) in the case of
Idamalayar project was 9 years, Kakkad, 13 years, Kallada, 5 years,
Lower Periyar, 6 years, and the mini projects, Peppara, 6 years, and
Madupatty, 8 years. The consequent cost overrun was Idamalayar: 285
per cent, Kakkad: 685 per cent, Kallada: 53 per cent, Lower periyar: 238
per cent, Peppara: 59 per cent, and Madupatty: 64 per cent (Government
of Kerala, Economic Review, different issues). Ideally, a revised cost
estimate should sufficiently cover the general price rise. Then what
remains in the revised cost escalation of a project over and above the
general price inflationary influences is a matter of serious consideration;
it may represent an over-estimation due to uncertainty or an element of
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deliberate attempt at wasteful mismanagement of resources. In the case
of most of the projects with time overruns in Kerala, the revised cost
estimates significantly exceeded the general inflationary impact,
signifying the effect of some ‘unexplained’  factors (of deliberate or
otherwise mismanagement)  on cost escalation. For example, for Kakkad,
about 62 per cent of the cost escalation remained  to be explained by
factors other than general inflation, and for Lower Periyar, about 11 per
cent.
The time overruns of power projects involves manifold and thus
heavy costs – besides incurring the cost escalation of the projects and
the power purchase costs, the system also is forced to forgo additional
sales revenue obtainable. Thus the cost of inefficiency at the planning
and execution level also is very high. “The basic reason for the power
crisis engulfing the State (Kerala) today is mainly …..the failure, of the
Electricity Board, in planning and in the timely execution of the power
projects.” (Government of Kerala 1997: 9) A host of factors are at work
here – changes in the technical design and feasibility report, original
cost estimates being based on inadequate or incomplete data and
unrealistic assumptions, inefficient management, inadequate geological
and technical investigations of the projects in their initial stages, vague
and ambiguous specifications and conditions of contract, delays due to
sluggish decision making at various stages of construction, lack of
availability of materials or of transportation facilities, high mobility of
planning and supervisory staff between projects during their construction,
militant trade union interference, excessive ecological concerns,
unwarranted court interventions for aggrieved contractors, and above
all, vitiating corruption, and indifference of the public.
There is yet another factor. Power purchase agreements (PPA) often
contain booby traps of forced purchase provisions12 ; in order to respect
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the PPA, the SEBs are sometimes compelled to back down their own
cheap generators. An apt case in point here is the PPA between the NTPC
and the KSEB in respect of the power from the Kayamkulam thermal
station. It being completely a ‘State project’, the KSEB should, by PPA,
purchase all the energy generated here. Though the average capacity
utilization factor is set at the usual norm of 68.5 per cent, the Kayamkulam
project is often operated at the full 100 per cent capacity factor, and the
Board is thus forced to  take in the whole lot. This in turn results in
backing down some of the hydro power plants, with the cheapest
generation cost of only 14 paise/unit13 . The Chief Engineer (Thermal, O
& M) of the KSEB has estimated that the Board could save Rs. 250.56
crores every year, if it needed to purchase only the normal generation (at
68.5 per cent capacity factor) from the NTPC project (Malayala
Manorama daily, June 14, 1999).
The Board, on the other hand, seeks to save its face by scheduling
these hydro power plants for repair, maintenance or renovation works,
even during the monsoon, when water, if not fully utilized, would spill
over from the small reservoirs of these plants. For example, (according
to an estimate of the Board), during the monsoon of 1998, water worth
Rs. 3.6 crores of energy was lost from the Peringalkuthu reservoir, as
one unit of 8 MW capacity there had been in outage for more than 11/2
years, though it required only some minor repairs. Similarly,  in Sengulam
power station, one unit had been in outage for more than one year, and
water worth Rs. 12 crores of energy was lost. Neriamangalam station
also had the same fate in that year (Mathrbhoomi daily, June 21, 1999).
At present, the daily electricity consumption in Kerala is about 33
MU, and on Sundays it goes up to 35 MU. The generators closed down
in the name of maintenance or repair works cost about 4 MU per day,
that is about Rs. 80 lakhs a day. (The loss would be even higher if
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estimated at the rate of the power purchase, which could have been
averted, rather than at the selling rate.) At Idamalayar (2 x 37.5 MW),
one of the two generators had been in outage since February 2000,
requiring only some minor repairs. The reservoir of the power station
had, by mid-April, water sufficient for 105 MU of energy; and the only
unit in service, if run at its maximum capacity during April and May, can
consume water equivalent to only 50 MU, which in turn means spilling
over of substantial quantum of water during the imminent monsoon.
Kuttiady power station of 75 MW capacity has been out of service for a
long time in the name of extension works for augmenting capacity by
another 50 MW. During the monsoon Kuttiady is operated at its
maximum, often beyond its capacity in order to utilize fully the monsoon
bounty, which otherwise would spill over. The unutilized water, equivalent
to 6 MU of energy (a revenue of about Rs. 12 million at the sales rate),
that the small dam contains at present, would go to waste during the
monsoon spill over (Mathrbhoomi daily, April1 6, 2000).  The turnkey
project work, started in 1996, should have been completed in 3 years.
The Government has now allowed six more months for completion
(sanctioning the demanded cost overruns to the contractor, a controversial
Canadian firm), which means substantial loss of water during this
monsoon also. The KSEB has estimated a daily loss of Rs. 36 lakhs, and
a total loss of more than Rs. 55 crores during the six months extension
period (Malayala Manorama, April 26, 2000).
In addition to letting some of the cheap hydro plants remain closed
down in the name of maintenance or repairs, KSEB also operates its
own thermal plants at minimum capacity factor. One unit of the
Brahmapuram thermal plant also is in outage and the other units are run
below 20 per cent of the installed capacity, while the Kozhikode thermal
plant units are operated below 30 per cent. The operating costs of these
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plants are reported to be very high, much more than Rs. 5/unit. Though
these stations are supposed to use low sulfur heavy stock (LSHS) as
fuels, at present they are run on naphtha, like the Kayamkulam (NTPC)
and Cochin (BSES) plants. It should be noted that nowhere in the world
is naphtha, which is highly volatile and very costly, used for power
generation. It was a reckless and disastrous choice for Kerala to have all
her thermal plants, both commissioned and under construction or
consideration, based on naphtha. And way back in 1996, the Planning
Commission opposed the use of naphtha as feedstock for new power
projects, considering the high generation cost per unit and the huge
foreign exchange outflow that naphtha imports might entail. Kozhikode
thermal plant is confronted with a threat of environmental problems also;
it has not yet obtained the green clearance from the Pollution Control
Board. If the Board objects, the plant will have to be closed down ! The
KSEB purchases about 6.5 MU of electricity every day from the NTPC
Kayamkulam thermal station at an exorbitant cost of Rs. 4.5/unit (the
generation cost is reported to be Rs. 5.5/unit), while its hydro-power
costs it only about 20 paise per unit (Mathrbhoomi daily, April 16, 2000).
Though the NTPC is willing to convert this ‘State project’ into a regional
one, in the event of which the purchase price would come down (as its
PLF increases), the State Government is dragging its feet. Power from
the Nuclear Power Corporation costs only Rs. 1.89/unit for Kerala, while
that from the Neyveli Lignite Corporation costs Rs. 1.04/unit (First phase)
and Rs. 1.87/unit (Second phase); Kerala also gets power from the NTPC
Ramagundam project at Rs. 1.57/unit only (The New Indian Express,
March 22, 2000). Thus there do remain quite feasible possibilities for
adopting fruitful means to reduce the power purchase cost to a substantial
extent – by converting the NTPC ‘State project’ into a regional one, and
at the same time by ensuring an enhanced share of power from the Central
pool and its regular and constant delivery.
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O & M  and E & A Costs
The proportion of O & M costs in the unit electricity supply cost
had a marginal decrease from 4.7 per cent in 1992-93 to 4.5 per cent in
1997-98. In general, the hydro-power systems of Himachal Pradesh and
Meghalaya have much higher (above 10 per cent) share of O & M costs,
while  Assam, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu,
much lower (about 2 to 3 per cent).
Establishment and administration (E & A) charges consist mainly
of the wages and salaries of staff. Its share in unit supply cost declined
from 15.2 per cent in 1992-93 to about 12.3 per cent in 1997-98. Himachal
Pradesh, Kerala, and Meghalaya have very high share of E & A costs,
often more than 30 per cent, while Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Jammu
& Kashmir, Rajasthan, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh show much lower
share than the all-SEBs average. As already explained, over-manning
especially in non-technical sections on account of the employment-
providing patronage of the Governments has been another source of
inefficiency. The labor productivity in the States’ power sector in 1997-
98 is estimated to be about 3.4 employees per MU of electricity sold, as
against less than 2.5 in many developing countries14 . We can have an
estimate of this inefficiency too. The total E & A charges in 1997-98
come out to be Rs. 8,009 crores, at a unit E & A cost of 27.29 paise/unit
sold, for an estimated number of 9,86,537 employees, giving an average
E & A expense of Rs. 81.18 thousand per employee per year. If labor
productivity increases to, say, 2 employees per MU of electricity sold,
(i.e., with the given quantum of sale),  then number of employees would
be reduced to 5,86,958, and the E & A costs, to Rs. 4,765.1 crores. This
gives a unit E & A charge of power supply of 16.24 paise per unit sold,
and a unit cost saving of 11.05 paise/unit, which is the cost of inefficiency
involved in over-employment. For Kerala, with an average E & A cost
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of Rs. 1.44 lakhs per employee per year in 1997-98  (about 1.8 times the
State sector average), the cost saving is turned out to be 19.78  paise/unit
sold, reducing the unit E & A cost to 28.88 paise/unit  from 48.66 paise/
unit.  For Delhi, it is 10.46 paise/unit, a reduction from 31.33 paise/unit
to 20.87 paise/unit.
Fixed Costs
The share of fixed costs, viz., depreciation and interest payments
in average cost of electricity supply declined from 25 per cent in 1992-
93 to 21.7 per cent in 1997-98. Interest charges have always commanded
a bigger share out of this – much more than 10 per cent. While the share
of depreciation rose from 7.6 per cent in 1992-93 to 9.2 per cent in 1994-
95 and then fell to 8.3 per cent in 1997-98, that of interest steadily declined
from 17.5 per cent in 1992-93 to 13.5 per cent in 1997-98. Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh have much higher stakes in
depreciation, around 10 per cent; Delhi and Himachal Pradesh, on the
other hand, the least, less than 5 per cent. The share of depreciation in
unit cost of Kerala remains around 6 per cent.
Very high interest charges are a big problem for many States –
Assam, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Meghalaya, and Uttar Pradesh have
higher share of interest in supply cost, more than 20 per cent. Delhi
maintains the lowest share position here also – nearly 4 per cent only.
Note that depreciation is an important item contributing to internal
resources generated, while interest charges are a real drain, and hence
increased share of the latter in total cost signals financial weakness of
dependence. In fact, the share of interest in supply cost could be
significantly reduced in a number of potent ways. SEBs in general do
not repay the State Government loans and the interest thereon. These
interest charges due to State Government are usually carried forward
every year, and the accumulated charges stand to make the balance sheet
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dip totally into the red. The situation could be eased by converting part
of Government loans into equity. Originally, the Electricity (Supply) Act
did not provide for an equity component, and the entire capital of SEB
consisted only of loans from the State government and from institutional
lenders. In general, a debt-equity ratio of 1:1 is maintained in all capital-
intensive industries, including the Central power sector. Hence in 1978,
the E(S) Act was amended to enable the State Governments to provide
for equity by converting part of their loans into equity. However, SEBs
in general are reluctant to take up this provision seriously, lest the Board’s
profits, likely to be exhibited consequent upon the introduction of equity
capital, should be liable to income tax. Yet this inhibition condones letting
the unpaid/unpayable interest charges inflate the supply cost. To the extent
that this part remains unpaid, the supply cost thus calculated turns out to
be an over-estimate. Recently, the Kerala Government has decided to
convert Rs. 1,552 crores due to it on account of accumulated loan and
interest, projected to reach Rs. 2,280 crores by 1998-99, into equity
capital, stipulating that the Board, like the independent power producers
(IPPs), earn a return of 16 per cent on capital employed. However, the
Board still continues its practice of carrying forward the interest charges
on Government loans and including the annual interest charges in total
expenditure, without allowing for any reduction possible on account of
equity introduction. Ideally, a 1:1 debt-equity ratio accounting practice
would reduce the interest charges by one-half, such that, for instance, in
1997-98, the unit interest cost in the State sector would be reduced to
14.85 paise per unit sold, and the overall unit supply cost, to Rs. 2.13/
unit sold. For Kerala, the benefit of reduction in unit interest cost would
be 23.13 paise/unit sold15 .
The Cost of Inefficiencies
That the cost of electricity supply in the State sector is an over-
estimate inflated by inefficiencies at all points is a foregone conclusion.
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Allowing for some improvement in operational, T & D, and man-power
planning efficiencies, as discussed earlier, would reduce the unit cost of
supply of all-SEBs substantially, by 60.77 paise per unit sold, to Rs.
1.67/unit from Rs. 2.28/unit in 1997-98. For Kerala, the unit cost saving
is 60.10 paise/unit, giving a unit supply cost of Rs. 1.32/unit instead of
the reported Rs. 1.92/unit, and for Delhi, 127.37 paise/unit, the unit supply
cost reducing to Rs. 2.24/unit from Rs. 3.51/unit. With a 1:1 debt-equity
capital base, the unit electricity supply cost would still go down for all-
SEBs to Rs. 1.52/unit sold, and to Kerala, Rs. 1.09/unit. The unit cost of
inefficiency in the State sector is about 33.2 per cent of the reported unit
cost of electricity supply, and in Kerala, about 43.3 per cent, and in Delhi,
36.3 per cent. And this is regardless of the unquantifiable cost of
inefficiency at all other levels ! Now the pertinent question is: Should
the consumer be made to pay for this inefficiency ?
It should, however, be stressed  that this conclusion is in the
accounting cost sense, and not in the economic, opportunity, cost sense.
The latter, for instance, demands that the opportunity cost of land, given
virtually free to the SEBs by the State Governments, also be included in
the total cost of supply.  Moreover, the straight line depreciation method,
followed for accounting by the SEBs, can by no means reflect economic
depreciation in considerations of the actually required replacement cost.
4.  Tariff and  Revenue Realization
In general, increasing block rate tariff that penalizes higher
consumption levels because of capacity shortage is in practice in India.
Hence the average tariff (or more precisely average revenue, AR, as it is
reported) at the aggregate level cannot be the price confronting the
customer in his decision making options; rather it can be only a supply
price to the utility. The average price for sales of electricity by the SEBs
was 18.8 paise/unit in 1974-75, 32.3 paise/unit in 1980-81 (growing at
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an annual average compound  rate of 9.45 per cent), which increased to
81.8 paise/unit in 1990-91 (at an annual rate of 9.74 per cent). During
the nineties, AR increased steeply from 89.1 paise/unit in 1991-92 to
184.5 paise/unit in 1997-98 (at an annual rate of 12.9 per cent). It is
expected to grow further by 7.25 per cent to 197.85 paise/unit in 1998-
99. During the seventies and eighties, the growth in AR was slightly less
than that in AC, but in the nineties, the former exceeded the latter. Larger
inter-State variations mark this trend. In 1980-81, Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh, and West Bengal had higher AR (more than 40 paise/unit); and
Meghalaya had the lowest, 22.6 paise/unit. In 1990-91, Maharashtra and
West Bengal had AR greater than 100 paise/unit, and Delhi, Assam, and
Rajasthan, greater than 90 paise/unit; Jammu  & Kashmir had the lowest,
about 36 paise/unit. In 1997-98, Assam, Bihar, Maharashtra, and Orissa
reported AR estimates greater than Rs. 2/unit, and Jammu & Kashmir
still maintained the lowest – 39.3 paise/unit. During the seventies, the
AR realized from electricity sales in Kerala registered an annual growth
rate of 11.6 per cent, during the eighties, about 8 per cent, and during
1991-92 to 1997-98, 13.3 per cent. Since the eighties, growth in AR in
Kerala has been lagging behind that in AC.
Though the SEBs are empowered by the E(S) Act to determine
prices with the State Governments expected to have only an advisory
role, it is the latter that effectively take decisions. The socio-political
compulsions of distributional solicitude of the Governments have resulted
in significant distortions in setting tariffs for various consumer categories
in line with the cost involved in supplying each group. Thus the cost of
providing electricity to low voltage (LV) consumers (domestic,
agriculture, commercial, etc.) is much higher on account of the additional
cost of extensive distribution network, and more importantly, of higher
distribution loss of energy, than the high voltage (HV) and extra high
voltage (EHV) industries. However, the agricultural and domestic
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consumers enjoy a privilege of heavily subsidized supply of electricity
at the cost of others. The AR realized from these two sectors is
significantly lower than the overall AR, while that from the commercial
customers, industry and railway traction is much higher. Agricultural
consumption is charged at the lowest. In 1997-98, the AR from this sector
was 27.7 paise/unit and from the domestic sector, Rs. 1.34/unit, against
the overall AR of Rs. 1.85/unit. On the other hand, commercial customers
paid on an average Rs. 3.33/unit and the industrial customers, Rs. 2.85/
unit. The AR realized from the railway traction was the highest, Rs.
3.75/unit in that year. During 1992-93 to 1997-98, the overall AR realized
grew at an annual average compound rate of 11.9 per cent, while the AR
from the industrial sector, at a rate of 10.7 per cent, that from the
agricultural sector, at 11.5 per cent, domestic sector, 11.6 per cent, railway
traction, 12.6 per cent, and commercial sector, 15.1 per cent (Table 11).
Subsidized Power Supply
There are wide inter-State variations in the structure of subsidized
supply of electricity. A consensus decision was taken at a conference of
State Power Ministers in January 1993 to charge at least 50 paise/unit
for agricultural power consumption. The consensus was repeated in 1996
also and a Common Minimum Action Plan for Power was put out in
December 1996. This tariff was to rise, within three years, to 50 per cent
of the unit cost of generation. But only a few States have implemented
the minimum tariff policy – for example, Orissa and Haryana, where the
sector has been restructured.  Kerala realized about 55 paise/unit of AR
from the agricultural sector in 1997-98; in the previous year, it was only
29 paise/unit. Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Maharashtra,
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal provide for agricultural
consumption at rates less than 50 paise/unit, and Tamil Nadu and Punjab,
virtually free. In Karnataka  and Madhya Pradesh also power supply to
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agriculture is free, but they have specified certain thresholds of connected
load (10 HP in Karnataka, and 5 HP in Madhya Pradesh) above which
some rates are charged. In Maharashtra, a paradoxically discriminatory
tariff structure is meted out to the agriculture sector – (i) metered tariffs
for irrigation pumps used in food crops fields that consume relatively
much less electricity, and (ii) unmetered flat-rate tariff, based on the
horse power, for pumps in water-intensive cash crops fields that consume
a lot more electricity !   The power of ‘sugar politics’ overwhelms any
economic logic in the allocation and use of such  scarce resources as
water and power.
Domestic consumers are favoured in Jammu & Kashmir,
Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, and West
Bengal, the lowest rate being  in Jammu  & Kashmir, 32 paise/unit. All
other States charge more than 100 paise/unit for domestic consumption,
the AR realized from this sector in Punjab, Gujarat and Haryana being
greater than their overall AR. On the other hand, the AR realized from
industrial and commercial sectors were in general more than double that
from domestic sector and more than 10-times that from agricultural sector
in 1997-98. It was so in most of the States also. In Kerala, the proportion
of the AR in the domestic, industrial and commercial sectors in 1997-98
was 1 : 2.06 : 3.6, while for all-SEBs, it was 1 : 2.13 : 2.5, for Karnataka,
1 : 2.56 : 4.23,  for  Tamil Nadu,  1 : 2.2 : 2.76 and for Andhra Pradesh,
1 : 1.98 : 2.2.
The inefficiency due to Government interference in price
determination16  favouring the agricultural and domestic sectors has much
to do with the financial performance of the SEBs. While  electricity
sales to these two sectors accounted for nearly one-half of the total sales,
revenue realized from them was only about one-sixth of the total sales
revenue of the SEBs in the recent years.
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5.  Financial Performance
Commercial Losses
That revenue realized from sales must be sufficient at least to
recover costs of supply is the basic prerequisite for the health of any
industry. Starting from this premise and comparing revenue realized with
cost incurred in the power sector serve the purpose of highlighting the
parlous financial position of the SEBs, which in turn is used to justify
the clamour and claim for reforms. The revenue-cost ratio went down
recently to as low as 76 per cent (in 1995-96), i.e., the sales revenue was
enough just to recover 76 per cent of the supply cost. The cost recovery
ratio has slightly improved since then. In 1974-75, it was 83.4 per cent,
which decreased to 77 per cent in 1980-81 (at an annual average decay
rate of 1.3 per cent), and further to 75.3 per cent in 1990-91 (at a rate of
0.23 per cent). It tried to regain in the next two years a little of what it
had lost and reached up to 82.2 per cent in 1992-93, but only to climb
down in the following years. Among the 19 States considered,
Maharashtra has had almost always the highest cost recovery ratio –
greater than 90 per cent. In fact, in the early 90s, the ratio was nearly 100
per cent, and in 1997-98, it was estimated to be about 98 per cent.
Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu also had a ratio greater than 90 per
cent in the recent past.  Himachal Pradesh has the unique distinction of
being the only State having had a sales-revenue that actually exceeded
the cost in one year (1996-97). Assam, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir,
Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh had less than 70 per cent cost recovery ratio
in most of the years, and J & K had the lowest, less than 20 per cent (see
Table 12).
The cost-revenue deviation or commercial loss (see Table 13) of
the SEBs (without subsidy) increased from Rs. 4,560 crores (implying a
rate of return (RoR) of (–) 12.7 per cent) in 1992-93 to Rs. 10,684 crores
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(RoR of (–) 18 per cent) in 1997-98 (at an annual growth rate of 18.6 per
cent), and is projected to increase to Rs. 12,323 crores (RoR of (–) 18.7
per cent) in 1998-99 (at a growth rate of 15.3 per cent). The 1983
amendment to the Section 59 of the E(S) Act, 1948, requires the SEBs to
ensure that the total revenues in any year of account shall, after meeting
all expenses properly chargeable to revenues, including operating,
maintenance, and management expenses, depreciation and interest
payable, as also taxes, if any, leave such surplus as not less than 3 per
cent, or such higher percentages, as the State governments may specify,
of the value of fixed assets of the Board in service at the beginning of
such year.  Thus the goal of tariff-making has become predetermined.
Yet, a tariff mechanism in line with the basic tenets of tariff-setting still
remains to be properly evolved in order to achieve this set goal. At present,
the tariff structure includes capacity (demand) and energy charge
components for large consumers, and consumption slabs for small
consumers. It should also reasonably incorporate the distinct cost elements
of fixed capacity costs, variable energy costs and customer-related costs
on equipment, metering, billing and collection, in the spirit of Hopkinson
rate structure17 . Despite the set goal of at least 3 per cent RoR, a marked
deterioration has been observed in the trend of the RoR of the SEBs in
general.
Such commercial loss suggests that if the total revenue earned by
the SEBs had been enough to cover the total costs, an additional amount,
say, of Rs. 10,684 crores would have been available in 1997-98 for
reinvestment in the power sector. That an accumulated amount of Rs.
45,177 crores would have been available with the SEBs during the 6
years from 1992-93 for ploughing back in the sector, had the total cost
been recouped, brings out the extent of the colossal loss the SEBs suffer
over time. Achieving a minimum 3 per cent RoR would have mobilized
additional revenue of Rs. 12,099.2 crores in 1997-98, and a break-even
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RoR, Rs. 10,487.5 crores. Universal adoption of the minimum 50 paise/
unit tariff for agricultural sales would have generated additional resource
of Rs. 2,254.2 crores in the same year. Such additional revenue could
have comfortably been used for capacity expansion and for improving
the performance of the existing assets. This would have also reduced the
burden of the State governments’ having to provide the SEBs with
subvention. That all these would have been possible every year leaves
one sickened and cynical at the morbid sector.
Maharashtra’s was the only SEB that earned a profit in 1997-98
(Rs. 111.8 crores) and in the case of other SEBs, the commercial loss
ranged from Rs. 18.9 crores for Himachal Pradesh to Rs. 1,735.8 crores
for Uttar Pradesh.  Gujarat and Punjab also had a loss of more than Rs.
1000 crores, and as many as 7 other SEBs, more than Rs. 500 crores (see
Table 13). In the early nineties also Maharashtra reported profit. It should
be pointed out that in general, the SEBs carry forward accumulated losses
and hence even if a particular year turns out profit, the cumulative reserves
may be negative. For example, the Kerala SEB earned net profit in 1989-
90 and again continuously during 1992-96, technically reporting the
statutory requirement of 3 per cent rate of return. However, in all these
years, KSEB suffered cumulative losses of no small magnitude.
Though subvention from the State Governments has improved the
situation, the RoR has still remained negative, the commercial loss, for
example in 1997-98, coming down to Rs. 6,977.8 crores, and the RoR,
to  (-) 11.7 per cent. Subvention has secured positive RoR of about 3 per
cent for Karnataka all these years in the nineties. Gujarat, Himachal
Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu also reported profit and
positive RoR for some of the years. As many as 6 SEBs suffered losses
greater than Rs 500  crores in 1997-98 even with the support of subsidy,
Punjab leading the list with a loss of Rs. 1,346 crores. Implementing the
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proposed national minimum agricultural tariff of 50 paise/unit across all
the States also would not have saved the SEBs out of the red. The RoR
in 1997-98, for instance, would still have been negative, (-) 10.5 per
cent.
Losses Due To Subsidized Power Supply
A major factor that determines the level of commercial loss is the
differential pricing policy. Loss results if the Government subsidy
payments and cross subsidy from other sectors are not enough to
neutralize the effective subsidies given to agriculture and domestic
consumers. Effective subsidy (cross subsidy) is defined as (AC – ARi)Qi,
where AC is the average cost of power supply, ARi is the average revenue
realized from the ith sector and  Qi   is the total power sold to that sector.
If this expression is positive, it is taken as a subsidy to the ith sector, and
if it is negative, as a cross subsidy from the ith sector. On this basis, it can
be seen that the effective subsidy to agriculture in general increased from
Rs. 7,335 crores in 1992-93 to Rs. 17,531 crores in 1997-98 (at an annual
average growth rate of 19 per cent), and that to domestic sector from Rs.
2,035 crores to Rs. 4,685 crores  during the same period (at a rate of
18.15 per cent per year). The subsidy given by the State Governments,
on the other hand, increased from Rs. 3,182 crores  to Rs. 3,706 crores
only (at an annual rate of only 3.1 per cent), and the cross subsidies from
the other sectors (industry, commercial and railway traction) from Rs.
3,911 crores to Rs. 11,289.3 crores during this period (at an annual rate
of 23.62 per cent). These two together could neutralize only about 57 to
83 per cent of the effective subsidies provided during this period. Note
that not all States compensate the SEBs for the subsidized electricity
sales to agriculture and domestic consumers. For example, in 1997-98,
8 State Governments (out of 19) did not provide any compensation at
all, and in the case of Assam, it was too nominal. Some of the State
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Table 13: Commercial Losses Due to Differential Pricing Policy
  (Rs. Crores)
        With  Subsidy            Without  Subsidy
1992-93 1997-98  ACGR 1992-93 1997-98 ACGR
 (%)  (%)
Andhra Pradesh 4.3 503.4 159.2 4.3 503.4 159.2
Assam 205.4 440.5 16.5 205.4 440.6 16.5
Bihar 279.6 370.2 5.8 279.6 370.2 5.8
Delhi (DVB) 207.3 759.9 29.7 207.3 759.9 29.7
Gujarat 100.0p 770.0 (-) 519.0 1270.0 19.6
Haryana 368.3 275.6 -5.6 403.6 525.6 5.4
Himachal Pradesh 1.6p 18.9 (-) 1.7p 18.9 (-)
Jammu & Kashmir 224.5 608.6 22.1 224.5 608.6 22.1
Karnataka 32.2p 60.7p 13.5 19.4 308.5 73.9
Kerala 65.3 218.8 27.4 65.4 370.8 41.5
Madhya Pradesh 112.9 322.1 23.3 492.9 697.1 7.2
Maharashtra 161.6p 111.8p -7.1   161.6p 111.8p -7.1
Meghalaya 1.9 10.1 39.7 8.4 19.1 17.9
Orissa 26.0p 257.9 (-) 85.4 300.9 28.6
Punjab 626.3 1346.0 16.5 626.3 1346.0 16.5
Rajasthan 22.1p 506.6 (-) 259.5 506.6 14.3
Tamil Nadu 92.4p 194.8 (-) 257.6 469.8 12.8
Utter Pradesh 807.5 63.8 -39.8 807.5 1735.8 16.5
West Bengal 257.5 483.1 13.4 257.5 544.1 16.1
Total 2724.9 6977.8 20.7 4560.3 10684.2 18.6
Note:  p = Profit;   ACGR  =  Annual Average Compound Growth Rate (%).
Source:  As  in Table 10.
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governments, on the other hand, write off the interest due to them also in
compensation for the subsidized sales. Moreover, the tilt in the
compensating mechanism has been to tax the other sectors heavily and
tap the maximum cross subsidies; in 1997-98, the State Government
subsidy constituted only 17 per cent of the total effective subsidy to
agriculture and domestic sectors, while the cross subsidy accounted for
about 51 per cent of it. Such over-burdening would have very serious
impact on the competitive and healthy operation of these sectors and
drive them on to set up their own captive generation.
Agriculture has accounted for around 80 per cent of the total
effective subsidies. Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar
Pradesh, where agricultural consumption is higher, suffer substantial
losses due to subsidized power sales (Tables 14 A and B). Remember in
Punjab and Tamil Nadu, the subsidy is cent per cent, and in Karnataka
and Madhya Pradesh, it is nearly so. Even the introduction of the national
minimum agricultural tariff of 50 paise/unit would still leave a significant
gap uncovered. In 1997-98, for example, this gap was of the order of Rs.
15,277.2 crores. Similarly, subsidized domestic power consumption has
been responsible for very high losses in Delhi, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh. Kerala had a cost-recovery ratio in 1997-
98 of 40.6 per cent in the domestic sector, 28.4 per cent in agriculture,
83.7 per cent in industry, and 145.7 per cent in the commercial sector
(see Table 11). Since agriculture accounts for only 4.4 per cent of the
total power consumption, subsidy-bred loss cannot be very high from
this sector. However, the domestic and industrial sectors’ consumption
constitutes about 82 per cent of the total, and thus imposes a heavy burden
of loss due to subsidy, especially the domestic sector,  which consumes
nearly 50 per cent of the total power. It should be pointed out that about
180 thousand households, consuming less than 20 units in a month, are
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given free power in Kerala. Moreover, in a bid to attract industries, Kerala
also allows reduced rates for new industries for the first 5 years, while
most of the other SEBs charge the ruling rate, with the subsidy going
directly to the beneficiaries from the State Governments. However, the
very rationale for such industrial subsidy in Kerala has soon got defeated,
as almost all of these new (metal, chemical, etc.) industries sprung up in
the State under the subsidy umbrella have been capital- and energy-
intensive with very limited prospects for creating employment
opportunities, the prime objective of the subsidy scheme. An estimate
has put the loss to the KSEB at more than Rs. 30 crores a year on account
of the subsidized power sales to these new industries that employ less
than 800 workers in all ! Unlike in most of other States, it is the
commercial sector alone that is made to bear the burden of cross
subsidization in Kerala.
The Receivables and the Dues
To ensure financial health of SEBs, it should be ensured in turn
that the prescribed tariffs are adequate for the purpose and are reviewed
periodically and revised, whenever necessary, consistent with the trend
of the operational parameters, input costs, etc. In addition, and more
importantly, it should also be ensured that the sales revenue these tariffs
yield is collected regularly in time and the outstanding dues are kept to
the minimum possible. As revenue arrears accumulate, the very purpose
of tariff revision gets defeated; and sadly this is so in almost all the
States. The uncovered revenue dues outstanding against different
consumers in the State power sector was always on the increase over
time, for example, from Rs. 6,720 crores in 1992-93 to Rs. 11,535 crores
in 1996-97, growing at an annual rate of 14.5 per cent. Accounting for
about 26 to 36 per cent of the annual sales turnover, these arrears represent
about 4 months’ sales revenue being locked up with the consumers at
any point of time, against the maximum allowable norm of two months’
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sales revenue. States like Bihar and Jammu & Kashmir have revenue
arrears of up to 183 per cent (in 1996-97) and 228 per cent (in 1995-96)
respectively of their annual sales, equivalent to about 22 and 27 months’
sales revenue respectively, while it is at the lowest in Tamil Nadu with 2
to 4 per cent (i.e., 7 to 15 days’ sales) only.  Assam, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh,
and West Bengal had often more than 50 per cent turnover of revenue
arrears, i.e., more than 6 months’ sales, while for Kerala, 23 to 43 per
cent, i.e., about 3 to 5 months’ sales (see Table 15). In 1997-98, it was
about 41 per cent for Kerala, nearly 5 months’ sales. Besides these
receivables against electricity supply, there are other sundry debtors also,
which, for example, in Kerala amounted to Rs. 326 crores in 1996-97
and Rs. 319 crores in 1997-98, about 47.1 and 32.8 per cent of, or 6 and
4 months’,  sales revenue respectively. Regular and timely collection of
all receivables could increase the liquidity available with the SEBs and
arrest the excessive loan-tropism. For instance, if all the SEBs could
limit the revenue arrears receivable to nearly two months’ sales norm,
additional revenue collected of Rs. 4,490 crores would be available with
them in 1996-97, which in turn means that they could dispense with
additional loans of the order of about Rs. 4,500 crores in that year or be
relieved of some of the old loans. In other words, this is the cost of
inefficiency in the management of sundry debtors in 1996-97. For 1995-
96, this amounts to Rs. 7,567 crores. That every year such huge cost of
liquidity restriction is left to be incurred explains the financial
accountability of the SEBs.
While on one side the receivables to the SEBs mount up, so are
their own outstanding dues to the major Central power sector undertakings
such as National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), National Hydro
Power Corporation (NHPC), Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), Power
Finance Corporation (PFC), etc. (see Table 15). These arrears (with
surcharge) to be paid by the SEBs are reported as on September 30,
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1998, to be over Rs. 16,800 crores. Some of the SEBs are overwhelmed
by these dues – Uttar Pradesh (over Rs. 3,480 crores), Bihar (over Rs.
3,010 crores), and West Bengal (over Rs. 1,600 crores) (Governmant of
India 1999: 89). On the other hand, some of the Central sector
undertakings are left poor by substantial amounts of receivables – NTPC:
Rs. 8,847 crores, NHPC: nearly Rs. 2,357 crores, and REC: nearly Rs.
2,727 crores.
Commercial Losses Due  to Inefficiencies
Now let us analyze this situation a little more objectively in terms
of the inefficiency estimates we have obtained earlier. To start with,
remember that with some, quite reasonably achievable, improvement in
the operational, T & D, and manpower deployment efficiencies, as well
as with 1:1 debt-equity capital structure,  the all-SEBs’ 1997-98 unit
cost of electricity supply has been found to fall to Rs. 1.52/unit.   A
summary of unit cost savings from efficiency improvement, for all-India
and Kerala, is given in Table 16.  Compare this with the AR realized
from sales of Rs. 1.85/unit in that year. This would yield an additional
revenue of about Rs. 9,459 crores over and above the total cost of
electricity supply – a commercial profit! Similarly, Kerala could earn a
profit of Rs. 121.06 crores and Delhi, Rs. 349.72 crores !  To this extent
then the reported commercial loss of the SEBs, attributed to the so-called
unit-cost-unrecoverable AR, turns out to be nothing but inefficiency-
caused loss. If we allow for the expenses capitalized, then the total cost
in the accounting sense would still decline and commercial profit increase.
And the vociferous arguments and assertions for steep rises in tariff rates,
proposed to be required to contain the increasing supply costs in order
to save the SEBs from the red, reduces to calculated camoufaging of
pampered inefficiency.
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However, this is not meant to justify the present unscientific tariff
setting. A rational tariff structuring should, among others, aim to help
the SEB earn a reasonable return over and above the total costs, that
differ at different voltage levels, once the effect of distribution loss factor
also is accounted for. Thus, for example, at the LV distribution level,
sufficient weight in terms of the actual distribution loss experienced
should be put on the cost of supply of electricity that includes revenue
expenditure and the fixed costs. This then gives, for instance, an average
tariff of Rs. 2.06/unit for 1997-98, with our estimated supply cost of  Rs.
1.52/unit, a mark-up of 15 per cent and a T & D loss of 15 per cent. This
is greater than the AR realized in 1997-98 by 21.51 paise/unit. For Kerala,
such an average tariff estimated would be Rs. 1.47/unit, higher by 22.75
paise/unit than the actual AR realized, and for Delhi, Rs. 3.03/unit, higher
by 37.86 paise/unit. While all the LV consumers are logically expected
to bear this charge, the HV-EHV  industrial  consumers  need  to  pay
much less, as supply of electricity to them involves lower unit cost of
supply as well as T & D loss.
Unlike such historical (accounting) cost method generally
practiced, a rational tariff policy would require charging the consumers
for the actual cost of service to them. The average price structured in
such a truly cost-reflecting tariff would be the long run marginal cost to
the system.
Cost of the ‘Cover Up’
Indeed, subsidization also involves problems of inefficiency.
However, the reported loss due to subsidized power sales to agriculture
in India is a substantially over-estimated one, in view of our earlier
explanation on leaving agricultural energy consumption as a residual
estimate. We have found that about  30 to 40 per cent of what is usually
reported as agricultural power consumption in fact represents
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unaccounted-for energy. Now assuming, quite reasonably, that the actual
agricultural consumption is only 65 per cent of the reported one, we can
estimate the commercial ‘loss’, due to subsidized sales of 57,707 MU of
electricity (instead of the reported 88,780 MU) to agriculture at a unit
cost-revenue margin of 197.47 paise/unit  in 1997-98, to be Rs. 11,395.4
crores, instead of the given Rs. 17,531.3 crores. The total effective subsidy
provided to both agriculture and domestic sector would then be Rs.
16,080.4 crores, and accounting for cross subsidy and subsidy from the
State Government, the ‘loss’ due to subsidized power sale would turn
out to be only Rs. 1,084.3 crores, instead of the reported Rs. 7,220.6
crores. Thus, a good part of the huge amount of ‘subsidy’ claimed to be
provided to agriculture, the slogan of which in turn is used unfairly to
enhance the populist image of the Governments, does in fact represent
the cost of inefficiency in not operating and maintaining the T & D system
properly.
But the story is not yet complete; we have not counted the course
of the 35 per cent of the agricultural consumption liberated as above
from misclassification. Let this be available for sales instead of being
thieved away. And with the heroic assumption that consumption is
satisfied at the given level of 2,93,478.9 MU (in 1997-98), and that the
operational efficiency, as explained earlier, has already brought down
power purchase requirement to (1,74,373.9 – 1,05,186.4 =) 69,187.5 MU,
we can have a further reduction in power purchase cost, using the 35 per
cent recovered energy equivalent to 31,073 MU, to the tune of Rs.
4,310.14 crores or 14.69 paise per unit sold, that represents the cost of
the ‘cover up’ (of energy theft by misreporting it as agricultural
consumption). This will reduce the ‘efficient’ unit cost of power supply
further to Rs. 1.38/unit, from the reported cost of Rs. 2.28/unit, with a
cost inefficiency18  of about 40 per cent ! Comparing this with the AR
realized in 1997-98 would yield a commercial profit of Rs. 13,770 crores!
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As an alternative scenario (in our flight of imagination), let this 35
per cent retrieved energy be made available for additional sale to, say,
industrial and commercial sectors. Then at a  cost-revenue margin of
103.65 paise per unit in 1997-98, this would bring in an additional cross-
subsidy of Rs. 3,220.7 crores, taking the total cross subsidy plus State
Government subvention to Rs. 18,216.4 crores, in excess of the ‘actual’
effective subsidy (we obtained above) to agriculture and domestic sectors
of Rs. 16,080.4 crores. There is thus a commercial profit (Rs. 2,136 crores)
due to (cross) subsidization ! This means that the cost, from this
perspective, of the ‘cover up’ alone comes out to be Rs. (7,220.6 + 2,136=)
9,356.6 crores ! The question now echoes: Should the cost of this
inefficiency be transferred on to the public ?
Though the real subsidy reaching the agriculture sector flows into
the vast fields of big kulaks, the powerful and embedded socio-political
sentiments guard and guarantee the practice of backing the backbone of
the economy. Many studies have given the lie to the illusion of power
subsidy to agriculture; for example, it has been found that in Maharashtra
(with the discriminatory tariff) the primary beneficiaries of subsidized
power in agriculture are the 5 per cent of affluent farmers growing water-
intensive cash crops such as sugarcane, not the majority of poor farmers
of food crops (Sant and Dixit 1996). The general profile may not be
different from this case. This subsidized unmetered power consumption,
though heavily cross-subsidized by the commercial and industrial
customers, has, however, given the Governments an easy and costless
access to vast vote banks, but at the cost of the financial health of the
SEBs in the absence of any comparable compensation.
Unlike agricultural sector, however, little economic justification
is found in subsidizing the domestic sector as a whole (supply to which
typically imposes higher costs on the system in terms of peak time
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requirements, extensive distribution network,  and losses). The fact that
in general the unelectrified households belong to the poorest of the society
questions the justification, if any, of such subsidy to this sector, that too
across the board. Social and welfare regards would require special
treatment to low income groups by means of a ‘life-line tariff’ applied to
the lowest consumption slab only. Cross subsidization required should
be tapped from other consumers in the same (domestic) sector, such that
the sector as a whole remains subsidy-cost-free.
Internal Resources
It should be stressed  that the performance of the SEBs was largely
determined for a long time by the assertions and defenses of their
statutorily intended promotional role in power development. The SEBs
were to subserve the socio-economic policies of the State and hence
expected not to view every aspect of developmental activities exclusively
from the point of view of profit or return, as highlighted by the
Venkataraman Committee of 1964. Thus there was no compulsive
requirement, till the late seventies (till the 1978 amendment of the Section
59 of the E(S) Act, 1948), for the SEBs to break even, as also even to
provide for full depreciation and/or interest payable on Government loans,
both of which could, under the Statute, be provided for only if there
were adequate surpluses after meeting all other obligations. Thus there
seemed to be no idea, let alone requirement, of the SEBs contributing
internal resources to expansion programs. The SEBs have not yet come
out of that spell of unaccountable, non-commercial performance, and in
general continue to have negative internal resources.
Net internal resource (NIR) refers to the surplus left with the SEBs
after meeting revenue expenditure and loan repayment obligations. It
thus includes operating surplus, depreciation and subvention from State
Government. In line with the tradition, the NIR of the SEBs slided down
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from Rs (–) 162 crores  in 1992-93 to Rs (–) 373 crores in 1997-98.
Maharashtra was the only State to report positive NIR in all these years,
and Bihar, Delhi, and West Bengal, negative NIR. Note that the actual
resource generation might be much less, as revenue outstandings are
high and on the increase. Further, redemption of capital loans might eat
substantially into the surplus.
The NIR available with the SEBs could be increased if they were
allowed to retain with them the State electricity duty (SED), collected
by the SEBs and passed on to the respective State exchequer. The SED
collections increased from Rs. 1,131 crores in 1992-93 to Rs. 2,365 crores
in 1997-98. Gujarat has had the highest SED collection – about 37 per
cent of the total in 1997-98; followed by Madhya Pradesh (16 per cent),
Maharashtra (12.8 per cent), Karnataka (5.8 per cent ) and Punjab (4.6
per cent). The average incidence of SED on the sale of electricity was in
the range of 5 to 8 paise/unit in the 90s, or nearly 5 per cent of the
estimated overall tariff for electricity sales. Provision for retention of
SED with the SEBs would have left them with substantial positive NIR
in all these years, except in 1997-9819 .
Before concluding, let us reiterate that lapses in financial discipline
and accountability penalize the system heavily. For an instance from
Kerala, consider the following observations by the Accountant General
on the KSEB:
“(i)  Loss due to investment of borrowed funds on short-term
deposits: Rs. 27.55 lakhs;
(ii)     Loss due to payment of penal interest towards non-submission
of statement to banks: Rs. 13.64 lakhs;
(iii)   Loss due to failure of the Board to detect the wrong transfer
of funds: Rs. 3.85 lakhs;
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(iv) Loss due to payment of penal interest, liquidated damages,
etc., due to belated payment of principal and interest to LIC of India: Rs.
74.99 lakhs.” (quoted in Government of Kerala 1997: 56)
6.  Conclusion
As in the case of other infrastructure facilities with high capital
intensity and long gestation period, the responsibility of power
development also was originally shouldered by the Government. And in
turn, the power sector was expected to subserve the social, political and
economic policies of the State, even though the SEBs were required by
the E(S) Act, 1948, to function as autonomous corporations. The
patronizing policies of the State resulted in excessive employment,
especially at the non-technical, administrative level, involving
unwarranted cost increases and in irrational pricing practices for
subsidized  power sales, irrespective of considerations of costs, leading
to substantial losses. In addition to Plan outlays allocated to the power
sector, Government subventions were also on the way in, such that the
SEBs never felt the pressing requirement to break even or to contribute
to capacity expansion programs. The unaccountability culture, thus
engendered and encouraged, permeated the whole institutional texture,
and the consequent gross inefficiency contagioned the system. The rot
set in. Losses mounted up, and prospects counted down. And then one
fine day, the Government awakened to the bitter truth that its coffer could
no longer contain such losses, and exhorted and enjoined the SEBs to
mend their ways and mind their means.  Then followed the pandemonium,
the chaos that is to precede any restructruring. By that time, however,
the lot had been cast.
The whole system could be spared from such avoidable chaos, if
the Government interference were kept to a minimum and the SEBs
were let to function as autonomous commercial-cum-service
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corporations, as required by the E(S) Act. We have seen that if some
minimum, affordable standards of efficiency were maintained at the
technical, and institutional/organizational levels in the functioning of
the SEBs, considerable cost savings could be achieved and this, coupled
with a rational pricing practice, could win the system a very comfortable
position. It could work even otherwise; if the Government fully
compensated the SEBs for its induced inefficiencies regularly and in
time, the industry could still sustain its survivability20 . The compensation
system has failed on both the fronts – the timely submission of the
accounts by the SEBs and the timely payment by the Government. Here
is an instance: ‘The rural electrification subsidy receivable from the
Government of Kerala for the loss incurred by the KSEB due to Rural
Electrification operations during 1985-86 to 1993-94 was estimated and
submitted to the Government for sanctioning the release of subsidy’ only
by 1996-97 (KSEB, Annual Statement of Accounts 1996-97 and 1997-
98). When will these accounts now hatch ?
The utter negligence and neglect of the means to ensure minimum
T & D loss has been another contaminated fallout of the Government-
sponsored inefficiency. Unmetered drawal of electricity is rampant in
several urban areas, in connivance with the Board  staff, or by errant
consumers enjoying protective patronage. The Union Power Minister
has recently dubbed this unaccountable-for energy as “theft and dacoity
losses”, amounting to about Rs. 15,000 crores every year. ‘He gave the
example of Orissa, where the private sector companies that have taken
over distribution of electricity are finding it difficult even to install meters,
what to speak of collecting the dues. “AES of USA is having to employ
goon gangs to install meters”, the Minister said.’ (The Hindu Business
Line, March 31, 2000). Isn’t the reform process initiated in Orissa then a
reflection of the defeated political will at the hands of a Frankenstein ?
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Compounding all these is the infamous X-inefficiency at all levels
of ‘work culture’, that has deteriorated to such an abyss that it remains
devoid of any accountability, a legacy of the original sin of service-only-
orientation forced on the SEBs. It may not be unreasonable to state that
this is in fact basic and central to many problems in the electricity supply
industry in India. And inefficiency continues to rot the system, the
inefficiency bred and fed by a host of factors at technical, institutional
and  organizational, financial as well as socio-political policy levels.
However, the most relieving aspect of this system predicament is that
the problems are just internal to the system, as we have shown above21 .
This then implies that there do remain sufficient quarters for remedial
exercises, meant to remove the problems that stand in the way of the
SEBs’ improved performance. In other words, what the system badly
requires is essence-specific reforms, not structure-specific ones.
The parlous financial position of the SEBs has come in handy for
the institutional lenders including the World Bank to press for structure-
specific reforms. The attraction of soft loans offered as a package with
reforms and of the selling out of public sector assets have cornered and
captured the political theory of corruption that governs the prodigal
governments. The result resembles an irreversible, disastrous
Alexanderian solution to the Gordian knot – the so-called reforms now
under way in a number of States which in practice will remain incapable
of addressing the real problems internal to the system. Will a forced
change of the form transmute the substance also ?
“Light is sorrow, my son;
Isn't darkness a pleasant one ?’’
                            - Akkitham (Malayalam poet)
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Notes
1 It should be clarified at the outset itself that power sector performance evaluation
has some unique features in that efficiency considerations need not follow the
beaten econometric/mathematical programming track. In standard economic text
books, ‘efficiency’ is exclusively referred to as allocative efficiency  - the
production of the ‘best’ or ‘optimal’ level of output by means of the most efficient
combination of inputs. With this definition, then, the distance between the ‘optimal’
or maximum output and the actual output indicates the inefficiency involved in
production. That is, the efficiency rating of a production process = (actual output/
maximum output). “Optimal’ or maximum output might be determined in various
ways – through economic or programming techniques. However, “When capital
equipment is capacity rated in terms of output units, as in electricity generation,
one can measure directly the denominator” in the above equation [Betancourt
1987: 369-370] and the short-run capacity (and hence capital) utilization and
efficiency measure coincide. Given this simple method of utmost clarity and
accessible interpretations, it is not worth indulging oneself in such econometric
exercises as constrained by the never-conclusive capital controversy, for one thing,
except as an academic fascination. Hence, in what follows, we analyse power
sector efficiency in the usual sense as it is employed in electricity economics.
2 The Ninth Plan envisages a prioritization of hydro-electric power development,
targeting an addition of 9,820 MW of hydro capacity, in order to rectify the
prevailing imbalance in the hydro-thermal mix. It should be noted that inadequate
hydel support in the Western and Eastern regions adversely affects the performance
of the thermal plants, as they are uneconomically used to provide only the peaking
power, thus having to be backed down during the off-peak hours.
3 There can also be some partial outages due to internal constraints of the deficiency
in achieving full rating of the units either in equipment or in auxiliaries, and also/
or due to external constraints such as shortage of fuel and coolant or absence of
adequate power evacuating capacity.
4 It is estimated that there are about 117 thermal units of 11,000 MW (out of a total
thermal capacity of about 59,000 MW) that have already completed more than 20
years of their useful design life (of 25 years); about 50 per cent of these stations
operate at less than 45 per cent PLF. Similarly, there are about 35 hydro power
stations that have been in operation for over 30 years in excess of their useful
operating life (Government of India 2000: 19-20).
5 The fluidized bed boiler design of these larger plants provides much higher
efficiency of combustion than the conventional manual or stroker firing, thus
reducing the quantity of fuel required.  Moreover, it maintains a low fuel bed
temperature preventing the formation of lumps of molten ash, a regular problem
with the combustion of Indian coal of high ash content.  Note that in this light the
increased PLF may be taken as not so much of better performance as of partial
adoption of a technological progress
6 Acceptance and adoption of PLF as a general criterion of plant performance
efficiency can have adverse effects in certain circumstances, as when units are to
back down for want of adequate system load. In fact, the practice of linking
employee bonus schemes to the PLF attained by the corresponding plants is
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identified as one of the factors contributing to aggravating grid indiscipline. It
should be noted that availability is the internationally accepted measure of plant
efficiency.
7 Both the invariable location-specificity of the hydro-power plants and the
economies in developing pithead-based thermal stations (as transportation of coal
has been found to be less economical than transmission of an equivalent amount
of electric power over long distances) necessitate extensive network of
transmission lines. Also there are economies in interconnecting different power
stations as well as systems in an electric Grid.
8 The Indian Electricity Act, 1910 was amended (in 1986) through Sections 39 and
39A to make theft of energy and its abetment a cognizable offence with deterrent
punishment of up to three years imprisonment.
9 That the agricultural consumption of power in India is highly doctored, due to its
being a ‘residual’ in estimation, is now a widely acknowledged fact; in the States,
where the power sector has been restructured, the regulators, in recognition of
this ‘misclassification’, have revised upwards the T & D loss percentages – for
example, in Orissa, from 23 per cent before restructuring to 51 per cent post-
reform; in Andhra Pradesh, from 25 per cent to 45 per cent, in Haryana, from 32
per cent to 40 per cent, and in Rajasthan, from 26 per cent to 43 per cent
(Government of India 2000: 35; also see Morris 2000, and Rao  2000).
10 The savings in T & D reduction could as well lead to an increase in energy sales
(to, say, the industrial sector, that suffers the most from power shortage) and thus
in revenue, instead of helping to cut down energy import and thus supply cost.
11 In 1997-98, remember, 4 SEBs had more than 88 per cent availability and 3 SEBs
had more than 75 per cent PLF.
12 This is because the PPA is in general designed for a base load plant only, which is
permitted to generate at full load whenever possible. The 1992 Notification, issued
in the wake of the 1991 opening up policy, does endorse such a costly design.
This commitment requires backing down of the existing cheaper power stations
during off-peak periods and monsoon season, causing uneconomic plant dispatch,
i.e., low unit cost power being replaced by high cost power (also see World Bank
1995: 84, and D’Sa, et al. 1999).
13 Maharashtra SEB also faces a similar problem of ‘systemic inefficiency’ due to
uneconomic ‘merit’ order, thanks to its PPA with Enron. Honouring the PPA (at
Rs. 4.50 per unit of Enron power) costs the MSEB a good part of the cheaper
power from Tata Electric Power as well as from its own thermal power plants
with costs around a fourth of Enron power (The Hindu Business Line, July 11,
2000).
14 Rajadhyaksha Committee on Power (1980) observes on this aspect: “Besides
low tariffs, the causes of the poor financial performance are the low operating
efficiencies, high capital cost of projects due to long delays in construction and
high overheads – mainly the result of heavy overstaffing. Although precise
comparisons are not possible, the average employees per MW of installed capacity
in India is 7 compared to 1.2 in the USA, 1.5 in Japan and 1.7 in the UK. Within
the country, the expenditure on salaries varies from 12 per cent to  40 per cent of
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the total income of the SEBs. Much of this overstaffing is due to SEBs being
compelled under political pressures to take on people they do not need.”
(Government of India 1980: 53).
15 Another solution comes from raising the available internal resources, through,
say, prompt collection of revenue arrears that could substantially reduce loan
requirements. This aspect we will consider shortly.
16 It should be pointed out here that courts have upheld the validity of the power of
the Government to fix tariff rates (e.g., 1988 (1) K. L. T. 727; 1987 (1) KLT 777;
1978 KLT 613; AIR 1960 SC, 610; 1984 SC 170 etc.). “It is true that the Board is
the primary authority to fix electricity tariff rates. But, there is a statutory power
reserved in favour of the Government under Section 22-B to issue, when conditions
exist, necessary orders to ensure equitable distribution of electrical energy. When
the power is so exercised by the Government, it can also fix the tariff rates, for,
the fixation of tariff rates is incidental to the power to regulate supply, distribution,
and consumption and use of electrical  energy and is also part of the regulatory
process of equitable distribution of electrical energy. The Government is free to
make their own classification of consumers for fixation of different rates of
electricity tariff and they are not bound by the specification, categorisation,
designation or division made by the Board for purposes of levying electricity
charges.” (1988 (1) KLT 727, Social S. G. of Assisi Sisters vs. KSEB, para. 7)
17 Hopkinson rate, popularly known as maximum demand tariff or two-part tariff,
includes a (fixed) demand charge per period based on maximum demand and a
variable charge based on actual energy consumption. The English engineer Dr.
John Hopkinson is considered the grandfather of electricity rate making.
18 Note that this aspect of inefficiency we have not included in Table 16.
19 Note that the legal validity of SED is in fact under question.  The Kerala High
Court has opined: “….the surcharge imposed adds to the revenue of the State and
surcharge order is a fiscal measure intended to augment the financial resources of
the State…It was argued that under Section 63 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, the
State Government may make subventions to the Board and this surcharge is
deemed to enable the Government to make subventions.  Section 63 does not
authorise the Government to raise its revenue from the consumers of electric
energy to enable it to make subventions to the Board.  Under Section 63, there is
no obligation on the Government to make any subvention and the grant is “entirely
on the bounty of the Governhment”…If the action was that the Board should be
benefitted by this surcharge, there was no necessity for the Government to collect
the same and them make subvention to the Board.” [1988 (2) KLT 680, Chakolas
Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. Vs. KSEB, paras 9, 24 and 25].
20 This, however, rests on the assumption that the SEBs do not tend to make unfair
use of the compensation facility by laying their own inefficiencies in the
exchequer’s net.
21 Committees after Committees have already identified these problems and
prescribed remedies, the timely adoption and execution of which would have
spared the system from the present predicament.
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